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參考文獻
一、中文文獻
（一）專書
Rogers, Robert and Rhodri Walters（2009），谷意譯，英國國會，臺北：五南。
吳庚、陳淳文（2014），憲法理論與政府體制，增訂版，臺北：三民。
吳庚、陳淳文（2019），憲法理論與政府體制，增訂六版，臺北：三民。
李惠宗（2012），憲法要義，六版，臺北：元照。
林子儀、葉俊榮、黃昭元、張文貞（2017），憲法：權力分立，三版，臺北：新學林。
洪家殷（2022），行政調查法論，臺北：元照出版，初版二刷。
倪伯萱（2016），美國聯邦最高法院憲法判決選譯第八輯，臺北：司法院。
國家發展委員會編（2014），我國獨立機關組織定位、業務屬性及相關機關權責分工之研究，臺北：國家發展委員會。
許志雄、陳銘祥、蔡茂寅、周志宏、蔡宗珍（2005），現代憲法論，三版，臺北：元照。
郭任昇（2020），司法研究年報第36輯行政類－對於獨立機關行政決定之司法審查標準-以美國聯邦最高法院「尊重原則」（deference doctrine）之分析為中心，臺北：司法院。
陳英鈐（2021），公投法與政治，臺北：元照出版。
黃錦堂（2005），行政組織法論，臺北：瀚蘆。
廖福特（2005），國際人權法─議題分析與國內實踐，臺北：元照。
（二）專書論文
林子儀（1993），美國總統的行政首長權與獨立行政管制委員會，收於：林子儀，權力分立與憲政發展，頁123-141。台北：月旦出版社。
黃丞儀（2007），鬆綁行政國家，收於：李模務實法學基金會編，九十五年度第十一屆法學論文徵選優勝作品集，頁51-79，台北：李模務實法學基金會。
葉俊榮（2003），獨立機關的制度重建，收於：政府改造委員會編，邁向「小而能」的政府：「彈性精簡的行政組織」相關決議暨政策報告集，頁53-57，臺北：行政院。
葉俊榮（2010），獨立機關之獨立性－論國家通訊傳播委員會設立之憲法爭議，收於：台灣行政法學會編，行政組織與人事法制之新發展，頁53-90，臺北：元照。
（三）期刊論文
司法院大法官為審理行政院就國家通訊傳播委員會組織法第四條及第十六條有違憲疑義聲請解釋乙案所舉行之說明會（2006年3月8日），邀請學者江耀國、李念祖、徐正戎、陳春生、黃錦堂、黃維幸、蔡秀卿所發表之意見書，台灣本土法學雜誌，第82期，2006年，頁89-116。
石世豪（2006），通傳管制機關立法實驗喊停：釋字第六一三號解釋待續，台灣本土法學雜誌，第87期，頁80-83。
石世豪（2006），趕不上歷史腳步的憲法釋義－簡評司法院釋字第六一三號解釋，月旦法學雜誌，第136期，頁21-27。
石世豪（2009），獨立機關行政處分之違法審查程序－綜評臺北高等行政法院96 年度訴字第307號等裁判，法令月刊，第7期，頁28-46。
行政院（2006），「國家通訊傳播委員會組織法」釋憲案補充理由書，台灣本土法學雜誌，第82期，頁117-136。
行政院（2006），「國家通訊傳播委員會組織法」釋憲案聲請書，台灣本土法學雜誌，第82期，頁60-88。
李仁淼（2016），國會調查權之行使方法與界限，月旦法學雜誌，第250期，頁86-105。
李念祖（2006），司法院司法院釋字第六一三號解釋評論，台灣本土法學雜誌，第87期，頁84-86。
李建良等（2006），「解讀釋字第六一三號解釋」題議討論，台灣本土法學雜誌，第87期，頁93-121。
李惠宗（2006），立法院行使調查權應有的法制設計：從釋字第五八五號解釋出發，台灣法學雜誌，第78期，頁92-106。
李惠宗（2006），國家通訊傳播委員會組織法違憲性的探討－司法院司法院釋字第六一三號解釋評釋，台灣本土法學雜誌，第86期，頁58-78。
李惠宗（2007），NCC委員停職事件及其相關問題平議，月旦法學雜誌，第148期，頁184-195。
李寧修（2018），論國會調查權之革新與展望，政大法學評論，154期，頁83-149。
李震山等（2006），「釋字第六一三號解釋與NCC違憲」座談會，月旦法學雜誌，第137期，頁88-103。
汪平雲（2006），照妖鏡與魔戒傳奇－釋字第六一三號解釋的深度解讀，月旦法學雜誌，第137期，頁75-87。
辛年豐（2011），從機關獨立到獨立機關－論公平交易委員會的現在與未來，公平交易季刊，第2期，頁151-182。
周志宏（2006），釋字第六一三號解釋與獨立機關的未來，月旦法學雜誌，第137期，頁5-24。
林明鏘（2006），正當性與相當性原則下之國家通訊傳播委員會組織法－評司法院釋字第六一三號解釋，台灣本土法學雜誌，第86期，頁79-85。
林超駿（2010），行政權之釋憲機制:美國聯邦訴訟(次)長(Solicitor General)制度與運作簡介，月旦法學雜誌，第180期，頁180-206。
林超駿（2019），試論監察院調查權之挑戰與變革，月旦法學雜誌，第293期，頁115-139。
胡博硯（2009），論國家通訊傳播委員會作成之行政處分的訴願決定機關，東海大學法學研究，第31期，頁69-104。
涂予尹（2020），論獨立機關的獨立性與其立法監督，臺大法學論叢，第4期，頁1845-1914。
高敏慈（2020），中央銀行獨立性改革與金融穩定效果，商管科技季刊，第1期，頁1-36。
郭介恆（2009），獨立機關與訴願管轄-最高行政法院二八年十二月二十六日庭長法官聯席會決議評析，月旦法學雜誌，第170期，頁236-247。
郭任昇（2020），美國最高法院對於獨立機關法律解釋的審查標準（上），司法週刊，第 2001 期，頁2-4。
陳信安（2015），立法、監察二院調查權爭議之再探，憲政時代，第2期，頁315-356。
陳英鈐（2005），民主鞏固與違憲審查—釋字第五八五號的困境，月旦法學雜誌，第125期，頁63-77。
陳淑芳（2006），獨立機關之設置及其人事權－評司法院司法院釋字第六一三號解釋，月旦法學雜誌，第137期，頁41-59。
陳淑芳（2009），獨立行政機關與訴願制度，月旦法學教室，第82期，頁101-113。
陳淳文（2012），論獨立行政機關之監督，政大法學評論，第126期，頁155-238。
陳新民（2006），試論NCC組織法的違憲性問題，台灣本土法學雜誌，第83期，頁1-30。
黃昭元（2004），憲法權利限制的司法審查標準：美國類型化多元標準模式的比較分析，國立臺灣大學法學論叢，第3期，頁45-148。
黃銘傑（2008），競爭法主管機關作為獨立行政機關之憲政組織定位及其正當法律程序－日本公平交易委員會之發展經驗與啟示，政大法學評論，第103期，頁63-107。
黃銘輝（2014），論美國法上法院對行政行為的司法審查密度－以通訊傳播行政為中心，臺北大學法學論叢，第92期，頁187-252。
黃銘輝（2019），假新聞、社群媒體與網路時代的言論自由，月旦法學雜誌，第292期，頁5-29。
黃錦堂（2008），德國獨立機關獨立性之研究－以通訊傳播領域為中心並評論我國釋字第613號解釋，中研院法學期刊，第3期，頁1-54。
黃錦堂（2009），通訊傳播委員會行政處分之訴願管轄機關－最高行政法院九七年十二月份第三次庭長法官聯席會議決議之評論，台灣法學雜誌，第124期，頁205-211。
廖元豪（2006），論立法院調查權之界限與範圍－釋字第五八五號解釋與美國經驗的參照，台灣法學雜誌，第78期，頁83-91。
廖元豪（2006），釋字六一三後，獨立機關還剩多少空間？，台灣本土法學雜誌，第87期，頁87-92。
廖義男（2011），獨立行政機關之監督與權力分立，法令月刊，第3期，頁156-159。
劉孔中（2006），怪哉！以鞏固行政權為職志的六一三號解釋，月旦法學雜誌，第136期，頁28-32。
劉靜怡（2006），有了釋字六一三，我們可以怎麼看待獨立行政機關？，台灣本土法學雜誌，第87期，頁245-248。
劉靜怡（2006），釋字第六一三號解釋後的獨立機關：NCC傳奇簡評，月旦法學雜誌，第137期，頁25-40。
蔡秀卿（2006），又是權力鬥爭的犧牲品－試評司法院釋字第六一三號解釋，月旦法學雜誌，第137期，頁60-74。
蔡宗珍（2015），我國憲法解釋中的權力分立圖像，憲政時代，第4期，頁491-558。
蔡茂寅（2002），政策統合機關、獨立機關定位及設立原則探討，國家政策季刊，第1期，頁23-38。
蔡茂寅（2004），獨立機關之研究：以中央行政機關組織基準法為檢討對象，研考雙月刊，第6期，頁71-80。
魯俊孟、賈志豪（2004），我國中央銀行改制獨立機關之省思與建議：以美國聯邦準備體系為例，公共行政學報，第13期，頁1-26。
蕭文生（2008），金融監理機關財政獨立性之法制研究，政大法學評論，第101期，頁1-60。
蘇永欽（2006），「國家通訊傳播委員會組織法」釋憲案補充意見書，台灣本土法學雜誌，第82期，頁137-147。
蘇永欽（2006），沒有方法的解釋只是一個政治決定－簡評司法院第六一三號解釋，月旦法學雜誌，第136期，頁6-20。
蘇永欽（2007），獨立行政機關委員的停職問題，台灣本土法學雜誌，第96期，頁141-152。
蘇永欽（2008），我國憲政體制下的獨立行政機關（上），法令月刊，第1期，頁4-30。
（四）學位論文
郭任昇（2006），從憲法觀點檢討獨立行政機關－以設置必要性、職權與組織為中心，國立臺灣大學法律學研究所碩士論文。
陳清雲（2014），立法院調查權法制化之研究，國立中正大學法律學研究所博士論文。
（五）網頁文獻
通傳會網站之聽證會公告，國家通訊傳播委員會網站，https://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/news.aspx?site_content_sn=37&is_history=0 （最後瀏覽日：2021年10月1日）。
委員會會議，金管會網站，https://www.fsc.gov.tw/ch/home.jsp?id=22&parentpath=0,1,11（最後瀏覽日：2021年7月16日）。
中央銀行，央行回應外界之提問，file:///C:/Users/stephenkuo/Downloads/%E5%A4%AE%E8%A1%8C%E5%9B%9E%E6%87%89%E5%A4%96%E7%95%8C%E4%B9%8B%E6%8F%90%E5%95%8F.pdf（最後瀏覽日：2021年7月27日）。
大法官第1363次會議會台字第9894號不受理決議，憲法法庭網站，https://cons.judicial.gov.tw/jcc/zh-tw/rrp04/show?ArticleId=a2561d31-998b-403e-80f2-a183a16795b0（最後瀏覽日：2021年7月22日）。
國家人權委員會，何謂「巴黎原則」？，國家人權委員會網站，https://nhrc.cy.gov.tw/public/data/931814563971.pdf（最後瀏覽日：2021年9月19日）。
國家通訊傳播委員會訴願、再審案件收辦統計表，https://www.ncc.gov.tw/chinese/files/21051/377_46037_210510_1.pdf（最後瀏覽日：2021年10月15日）。
大法官107年度憲一字第11號不受理決議，憲法法庭網站，https://cons.judicial.gov.tw/docdata.aspx?fid=98&id=325721（最後瀏覽日：2022年3月2日）。
自107年6月15日起，不服國家通訊傳播委員會所為之行政處分，應直接提起行政訴訟-歷史資料，國家通訊傳播委員會網站，2019年2月2日新聞稿，https://www.ncc.gov.tw/Chinese/news_detail.aspx?site_content_sn=8&cate=0&keyword=&is_history=1&pages=2&sn_f=40925（最後瀏覽日：2021年10月15日）。
政府改造委員會召開第六次幕僚會議，總統府網站，2002年3月23日，https://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/1650（最後瀏覽日：2021年7月11日）
總統府網站，http://www.president.gov.tw/2_special/innovation/t6-5-1.html（最後瀏覽日期2018年7月1日）。
中央銀行法務室，「中央銀行於政府組織改造中機關定位之說明」新聞稿，中央銀行網站，2010年1月15日，https://www.cbc.gov.tw/tw/cp-432-35977-D9D13-1.html（最後瀏覽日：2021年7月27日）。
監察院通過對最高法院檢察署檢察總長陳聰明之彈劾案，監察院網站，2010年1月19日，https://www.cy.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=124&sms=8912&s=4950 （最後瀏覽日：2021年7月22日）。
陳炳宏，全球一動訴願成功 NCC：不解與遺憾，自由時報，2015年10月22日，https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/breakingnews/1484451（最後瀏覽日：2021年10月21日）。
施孝衡，「百日民調」小英略勝馬英九，央行總裁彭淮南滿意度破8成，風傳媒，2016年8月26日，https://www.storm.mg/article/159142（最後瀏覽日：2021年10月5日）。
行政院內部運作情形，行政院網站，2018年1月17日，https://www.ey.gov.tw/Page/53AE96C4D8CF9362（最後瀏覽日：2020年9月13日）。
2019年3月17日之蘋果新聞網，才挨批拖延反媒體壟斷法NCC證實草案遭政院退件，https://tw.appledaily.com/new/realtime/20190317/1534921/（最後瀏覽日期：2021年12月6日）。
楊雅雯，國家人權委員會是啥米？－廖福特研究員談人權研究、公共參與及學術生涯（上篇），中央研究院法律研究學網站， 2020年12月3日，https://www.iias.sinica.edu.tw/blog_post/1193?class=96（最後瀏覽日：2021年9月19日）。
司法院參事室，司法院研議設量刑委員會為二級獨立機關，司法院網站，2021年1月29日，https://www.judicial.gov.tw/tw/cp-1429-367179-699e8-1.html（最後瀏覽日：2022年8月4日）
黃揚明，【台鐵花蓮出軌】太魯閣號出軌案3監委申請自動調查，鏡週刊，2021年4月6日，https://www.mirrormedia.mg/story/20210406inv013/（最後瀏覽日：2022年5月10日）。
林昱梅，合理化旋轉門條款以維護公正廉明，國家人力資源論壇，第5期，2021年5月28日，https://www.exam.gov.tw/NHRF/News_EpaperContent.aspx?n=3778&s=43000&type=A020C2C87B55986B（最後瀏覽日：2023年8月16日）。
司法院刑事廳，司改2.0量刑改革續航完成「刑事案件妥適量刑法草案」新聞稿，司法院網站，2021年7月30日，https://www.judicial.gov.tw/tw/cp-1887-465733-974e3-1.html?fbclid=IwAR2pgBOdfk1M3Cu9JFsIlIpZcjFsEojBxDf1rherVcc0OdcEltOCCPkwjcE（最後瀏覽日：2021年9月19日）。
2021年9月30日之聯合新聞網，行政院會通過「公投不在籍投票」可跨縣市但未納國外，https://udn.com/news/story/6656/5782366（最後瀏覽日：2021年12月6日）。
院總第23號委員提案第27046 號（立法院第10屆第4會期第4 次會議議案關係文書），2021年10月8日，法源法律網，https://www.lawbank.com.tw/news/NewsContent_print.aspx?NID=180385.00（最後瀏覽日：2022年2月17日）。
曾盈瑜，【線民風暴3】缺乏政治領導、綠營憂促轉會爛尾，鏡週刊，2021年10月27日，https://www.mirrormedia.mg/story/20211026inv004/?utm_source=feed_related&utm_medium=yahoo（最後瀏覽日期：2023年4月18日）。
2021年11月20日聯合新聞網，促進轉型正義基金預計明年成立首筆收入為中影9.5億元，https://udn.com/news/story/6656/5904696（最後瀏覽日期：2021年12月25日）。
內政部網站，https://www.moi.gov.tw/cp.aspx?n=525（最後瀏覽日：2021年12月6日）。
本會發布0402臺鐵第408次車清水隧道重大鐵道事故調查報告，2022年5月10日，運安會網站，https://www.ttsb.gov.tw/1133/1178/1179/32411/post（最後瀏覽日：2022年5月10日）。
二、外文文獻
（一）專書
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2005), The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions. 9th ed. Washington, D.C.: Board of Governors.
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（四）政府公報
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rule Making. Federal Communications Commission Record 17:4798-4872.
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