自從德國哲學家施雷馬柴（1768～1834）之後，西方哲學已經對「解釋」和「詮釋」有所區別。「解釋」是對於一個對象（譬如，經文）運用若干規則以釐清錯誤的解釋。「詮釋」就不具有「解釋」的性格，其目的不在解釋經文，而是與了解的行為有關。詮釋學者所問的問題，優於解釋者的工作。哪些條件必須滿足才能稱為了解的行為呢？詮釋包含「原則」－「規則」的解釋。《引導論》是不被收在三藏內的佛教論典，相傳是佛的弟子迦旃延所造。其目的是要當作佛經註疏家的手冊。《引導論》無意成為一部論書，也不是佛經註疏家碰上難題時可以尋求協助的一套規則。現代佛教學術界常常把《引導論》看成詮釋學的著作，卻完全忽略或很少注意到最近二百年來詮釋學的堅強哲學基礎。本文嘗試說明《引導論》具有什麼樣的詮釋學價值。在第一部分，我討論了《引導論》中〈範疇〉和〈方法〉二品的內容差異。二者都提供了不少角度，讓吾人從經文中尋得真正「含意」。本文的主要部分，則仔細檢視〈範疇〉這一品。我想提出一個特殊問題質疑〈範疇〉。詮釋學有一個原則：意義是無盡的。換言之，如果認為我們只要掌握充分的解釋規則就可能完全了解一切事物，未免太天真了。了解是一種理想，而非觸手可及的目標。《引導論．範疇品》如何防衛這種「過剩的意義」呢？

Since the German philosopher Schleiermacher (1768～1834) Western philosophy has adopted a distinction between problems of ＂interpretation＂ and problems of ＂hermeneutics＂. ＂Interpretation＂ is the application of rules to an object (for example, a text) in order to distinguish wrong from correct interpretations. ＂Hermeneutics＂ does not share this applied character of ＂interpretation＂. ＂Hermeneutics＂ does not aim at explaining texts but instead relates to the act of understanding itself. The questions asked by the hermeneutician precede the work of the intepreter. What conditions must be fulfilled so that an act could be an act of understanding? Hermeneneutics consists of ＂principles＂; interpretation of ＂rules＂. The Nettippakaraṇa (Guide) is an extra-canonical Buddhist scripture, ascribed to the Buddha's disciple Kaccana. It intends to be a manual for commentators on the Buddhist scriptures. The Nettippakaraṇa (Guide) is an extra-canonical Buddhist scripture, ascribed to the Buddha's disciple Kaccana. It intends to be a manual for commentators on the Buddhist scriptures. The Nettippakaraṇa does not intend to be a commentary itself, nor is it merely a set of rules which the commentator can turn to whenever commenting on a difficult section in the scriptures. Modern Buddhist scholarship often uses the term ＂hermeneutics＂ in connection with the Nettippakaraṇa does not intend to be a commentary itself, nor is it merely a set of rules which the commentator can turn to whenever commenting on a difficult section in the scriptures. Modern Buddhist scholarship often uses the term ＂hermeneutics＂ in connection with the Nettippakaraṇa, however, with no or little regard to the strong philosophical underpinning which the concept of hermeneutics has received over the last two centuries. This paper attempts to indicate in what sense the Nettippakaraṇa may have hermeneutical value. In a first section I discuss the difference between the two categories of principles in the Nettippakaraṇa, the ＂hāras＂ and the ＂nayas＂. Both offer a number of angles from which one can investigate the text for ＂implications＂. The main section of the paper takes a closer look at the first class of principles, the hāras. I wish to confront the hāras with one specific question. One of the principles of hermeneutics is the idea that meaning is inexhaustible. In other words, it would be naive to suppose that complete understanding of everything is possible, if only we had sufficient rules of interpretation. Understanding is an ideal rather than an immediate goal. How do the hāras in the Nettippakaraṇa safeguard this ＂surplus of meaning＂?