本文分析以追求效用極大化及一般均衡分析的模型設定，分析在既已課徵所得稅的環境下，假如對保險人與被保人課徵保險稅後的行為反應與經濟福利的變化。本研究探討在保費，損失扣除不同條件的環境、稅制與財富下，建立一個兩稅目三財貨的完整模型，分析結果顯示在Cobb-Douglas形態的效用函數下，如何選擇最適休閒消費與保險最適規模將隨著需求彈性、事故損失、所得稅稅率、工資率與總工時限制等條件，而產生迥異的結果。最後定額與比例保險稅的差異歸宿分析部份，則透過電腦試算模擬，結果發現與Power and Tzeng(1998)僅以財富決定效用的模型的結論剛好相反；即比例保險稅制下的稅後預期效狦水準上較定額稅為高。

　　　　　This paper explores the effects of the insured consumers' behavior and the social welfare under the influence of distorted insurance premium tax environment. Furthermore, this paper investigates the utility maximum model for the insured and the decision making for the insurance and leisure consumption and its' tax system efficiency, taking into account tax system and health. The author construct a completed model of two tax type and three goods by introduction a Cobb-Douglas function style. To analysis how to make the best choices (optimal insurance & leisure consumption) under the elastic of demand, accident loss, income tax rate, wage rate, and total work hours. Both the theorem are proved and computer simulated. The final result reveals the better effectiveness occurs when the proportional tax policy is implemented. Meanwhile, the optimal scale of the consumption and higher than the proportional tax.