本文利用一個兩市場分別位於直線之兩端點的線性空間模型，討論在單一出廠價格及單一運送價格二種訂價制度下，購物中心之廠址選擇，並比較此二種訂價制度下之價格、銷售量、利潤及福利。購物中心之廠址及廠商數由購物中心老闆（簡稱資本家）決定，價格則由廠商極大化利潤決定。在線性需求與成本函數的假設下，本文得到的結論是：(1)在此二訂價制度下，資本家均會將購物中心設立於需求較小之市場而有角隅解，但在「運費外加」的情況下，則可能得到中間解；(2)單一出廠訂價之產量高於單一運送訂價之產量；(3)廠商偏好採用單一出廠訂價，但資本家之偏好則未定；(4)單一出廠訂價之社會福利必定高於單一運送訂價之社會福利；(5)單一運送價格制度下最適廠商家數之多寡隨支付給資本家權利金之比率增加而減少。

　　　　　This paper adopts a line space model to examine the optimal location of a shopping mall under mill pricing and uniform pricing and to compare the effects of the pricing policies on price, output, profit, and welfare. In this model, the optimal location of a shopping mall is determined by the capitalist, and the price is determined by the dealer. Under linear demand and cost functions, we have reached the following main conclusions: (1)the capitalist selects his optimal location at the market with the smaller demand under the two pricing policies; (2)total output under mill pricing is higher than that under uniform pricing;(3)the dealer will prefer mill pricing, whereas the preference of the capitalist is indeterminate; (4)the welfare level under mill pricing is definitely higher than that under uniform pricing; (5)under uniform pricing, the optimal number of firms declines with an increase in the royalty ratio paid to the capitalist.