銀行為龐大社會資金之儲存地，它也挹注企業投資所需，獲取利潤以為儲存資金利息之用，若發生倒閉，對於社會經濟秩序必定造成重大影響，因此世界各國對於銀行的營運，莫不加以各種管制，以推動經濟成長並減少銀行倒閉的機率。 其中常被探討的管制措施不外乎為風險性資產導向資本管制(risk-based capital regulation)與存款保險制度(deposit insurance system) 。前者規定依據銀行風險結構，制定所需的資本水準，藉以增加銀行承擔損失的能力，減少倒閉機率。後者則透過銀行參加存款保險，減低不必要的風險，然而保險費支出提高了資金成本，也影響投資機會組合的選擇。本文旨在探討這兩種管制措施對減少風險及強化資產配置之有效性，彼此間是否存在替代關係，以及若存在這樣的關係時，管制者應如何重新思考保險費率的訂價決策。

　　　　　Banks absorb social capital to satisfy the demand of business investment. In case bank failures occur, there will be a huge impact in economic social orders. Most of the countries in the world set different regulatory policies to decrease the probability of bankruptcy. The most often discussed policies are a risk-based capital regulation and a deposit insurance system. The former addresses required bank capital level determined by asset risk structure. This policy enhances the ability of banks to absorb losses and decrease the probability of bankruptcy. The latter shifts bankrupt risk to a deposit insurance institute. It also increases capital cost and influences the investment portfolio at the same time. This article researches the substitute or compensatory relationship existing between the two policies, and how the regulator should reconsider the pricing decision of regulatory tools when such circumstances exist.