本文證明金融銀行體系下，總經理之固守職位代理問題如何影響均衡時總經理的授信決策。文中透過賽局理論建構均衡，觀察均衡時總經理採取各種授信決策的均衡條件。本文驗證當考慮固守職位時，則總經理會從事低利率授信之決策；當考慮個人聲譽時，總經理會考慮採取高利率授信決策。但若將以上兩項因素合併討論，則發現總經理授信決策會考量本身授信能力、轉換工作成本與聲譽等因素。

This paper studies the association between managerial entrenchment of agency problem and loan decisions in the equilibrium. We adopts game theory to build equilibrium, especially how managers make loan decisions. We find bank manager selects low rate to entrench themselves and high rate for building reputation. In presence of both reputation and entrench incentives, managers’ loan decisions consider talent, relocation costs and reputation.