在〈存有論的相對性〉一文中蒯因論證，指稱的不可測度說具有普遍可運用性：任何人之任格語詞的指稱是不確定的。他並進一步主張，指稱的不可測度說的普遍可運用性似乎會導致一個由意窘境：任何語詞的指稱之間是沒有差異的。而他認為，這個指稱的無差異性將會蘊涵一個不可接受的存有論上之結果：事物之間的無差異性。有人建議蒯因的論證之用意有兩個面向：一方面，他試圖論證當指稱被理解為「絕對的」指稱，上述從指稱的不可測度說到語意窘境的推論是有效的，而這個指稱概念也就被證明是無意義的；另一方面，他試圖指出當指稱這個概念被理解為「相對的」指稱，上述的推論則是無效的。然而，本文論證，就算指稱被理解為相對的指稱，上述的推論仍是有效的，易言之，上述的語意窘境是不可測度說一個不可避免的結果。

　　　　　In his essay "Ontological Relativity" Quine has argued that the thesis of inscrutability can and should be applied generally, i.e., it is indeterminate whether anyone's any term refers to one kind of things as opposed to others. He has further claimed that the generality of the applicability of the thesis seems to force us into a quandary: the absurd position that there is no referential difference between any terms. The intention of Quine's advocacy of the argument is not clearly elucidated in the text. It has been suggested that the aim of Quine's argument is twofold: on the one hand, it is to show that the derivation from the inscrutability of reference to the unacceptable semantic quandary is invalid if the concept of reference is conceived "relatively"; on the other, the derivation will go through if the concept is understood "This paper, however, argues that the quandary is not merely a seeming, but an inevitable consequence of reference is conceived relatively.