Due to inexorably rising scale of retail establishments, the monopoly power of modern distribution channels for consumer products have been apparent shift from upstream manufacture to the downstream retailer. In this paper, we explore the role of bargaining arrangements in improving coordination between channel members. By using the methods from the game-theory literature in marketing, we analyze the effect of five different types of channel power on the distribution of channel profits as well as consumers' surplus. The five different types of power structures between one manufacture and one retailer include: two Stacklberg games (manufacturer-Stackelberg: MS and retailer-Stackelberg: RS)、vertical Nash game(VN)、bargaining games(BN) and vertical integration(VI). With a linear demand function, there are several key insights from our analysis. 1) The relative priority of five different types of power structures is that: Both of the vertical integration (VI) and the bargaining of wholesale's price and retailer's margin simultaneously (BN(w，n)) are the best types power structure; the bargaining of single variable (wholesale's price or retailer's margin) game is the second choice; the vertical Nash game(VN) is the third choice; and the Stacklberg's leader type power structure is the worst one. 2) The Stacklberg's leader can make a Pareto improvement to all channel members, if the stacklberg's leader releases his channel power and become a bargaining game player. 3) The bargaining of single variable will result in higher profits thatn vertical Nash game, due to double marginizations can be reduce more effectively in the bargaining process. 4) With the bargaining of wholesale's price and retailer's margin simultaneously, the bargaining game can duplicate the cannel members to achieve the results as does the vertical integration.