本文試圖為蘇珊‧列芬新作進行書評。蘇珊. 列芬從柏拉圖語言哲學延伸出新的觀點，重新處理哲學典詩之間的爭執。進路新穎，卻有相當高的可行性，達到很好的成果。但本書中，詭辯術或其他哲學觀點僅僅被視為這篇對話的非主要對手，似乎並不恰當。此外，作者最具有獨創性的兩項論點，仍值得商榷：一、關於「正確名稱」指涉對象的說明；二、作者協調《理想國》第二、三卷及第十卷的辦法。就第一點，本文質疑這套正確名稱的說法是否能適用於專名；就第二點，則以柏拉圖詩論中的「模仿」問題加以檢視。期能對本書提供一項批判性討論的可能。

This piece reviews Levin's new work. Levin develops her study of Plato's philosophy of language. With such a new study, she revisits the quarrel between philosophy and poetry. This book achieves some worthy results. Yet the significant role of the sophistry seems to escape Levin's notice. Besides, I argue with her for two points: First, she states a good explanation for the referents of correct names, while it needs a further explanation whether this can work in the cases of proper names. Second, she tries to show the consistence of the Republic II, III and X, while I doubt whether this attempt can face Plato's strong position against mimesis in poetry.