賴特（Crispin Wright）於其1992年之文章中，為實在論與反實在論之爭提出了一個新的看法，也因此，吾人實可對實在論者與其對手間之爭論焦點有一番新的認識。賴特認為：實在論者與其對手間之爭論，實非針對「語句是否能具真理傾向（truth apt）」此一問題而發，而係針對「語句究竟能有何種真理述詞」此一問題而發一亦即：吾人可謂實在論者與其對手之爭，實為對於「語句之真」究竟是「真率（'robust'）之真」抑或僅是「最小之真」之爭。對蒯因（Quine）著名之「指稱之不可測」（the Inscrutability of Reference）主張，賴特之探究進路實有重要之哲學理趣。對此，本文擬指出：賴特於其1997之文章中提出「真理之最小論」（minimalism about truth）論證，並藉以反對蒯因之「指稱之不可測」主張，整體而言並未成功，此為本文之主要重點所在。儘管甘此，賴特之探究進路與「語意理論之形上地位」間究竟有何關係，亦為一重要問題。此為本文最後所將著墨之重點。

　　　　　Crispin Wright (1992) has reshaped debates about Realism by offering a new landscape of what's at stake in the discussions between realists and their opponents. Instead of arguing whether a given discourse can be truth apt, discussion should focus, Wright contends, on what kind of truth predicate a discourse can enjoy. Namely, whether truth for a discourse can be 'robust' or merely 'minimal'. Wright's approach has important implications for Quine's well-known Thesis of the Inscrutability of Referenc. The bulk of this paper will be devoted to showing that an argument involving minimalism about truth which Wright (1997) offers against the Inscrutability Thesis fails by reduction. By the end of the paper, we'll see how Wright's proposed frame of discussion for Realism bears on the metaphysical status of Semantic Theories.