To present a relatively clearer picture of the PRC (People's Republic of China), this article reviews the overall political, economic, social, military and diplomatic situations of the Chinese mainland over the past year (2002), plus Beijing's attitudes toward Taiwan, and also ventures an account of likelihoods in these regards in the year ahead. The most notable PRC political event of 2002 was the Communist Party's 16th Congress in November when succession by Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, etc. of the fourth generation took place. Economically, the PRC continued its high growth - possibly by 7.9% in the final analysis - despite the global sluggishness. Socially the regime tightened its grips in preparation for the party congress, but major mass protests of various types, including overriding of TV signals by Falun Gong followers, were recorded. Diplomatically the drive was for a bigpower image and a higher status by expanding external ties in the name of anti-terror cooperation and by actively promoting high-level diplomacy and hosting international meetings. As regards cross-Taiwan Strait relations, Beijing re-expounded its “one China” stand, adjusted its “listen and observe” tactics vis-a-vis Taipei, and started laying additional stress on matters of economic united front, calls for full-scale “three links,” and pressures through overseas sources to make Taiwan “abandon independence and opt for unification.” But as the actual changes of shifts - party, government and military - will have to wait till the 10th National People's Congress holds its First Session in March 2003, the PRC power workings are still in the midst of transition from “the outgoing to the incoming.” Besides, the new collective leadership formed with Hu Jintao at its head by the 16th Central Committee in November needs some time of “grinding” to fit in, and Jiang Jemin and other third-generation top men are likely to keep exerting more or less influence for a while. Therefore, the internal and external PRC policies can be expected to remain relatively stable in the period immediately ahead. The PRC political gravity in 2003 will be around rearrangements of state machines personnel beginning at the 10th NPC First Session, with emphasis on consolidation of the new collective leadership and on continuation of stability. Endeavor for sustained high economic growth will be made by the new leaders in their quest of power and prestige. Calls for stability will remain loud and clear in the hope that Beijing will be politically secure and free from social unrests. As for external relations, big-power diplomacy will go on for further multi-polar development of the international structure. The regime, in its cross-strait dealings, will policy-wise continue in the framework of “Jiang(Zemin) setting the rule for Hu (Jintao) to follow,” and on the basis that combines “peaceful unification” under the “one country, two systems” formula with Jiang's “eight-point proposal.” This, in practice, means foremost emphasis on more united front activities to bring about direct “three links” between the two sides.