有鑒於近年來營建業屢賈傳出經營危機或大股東掏空公司資產等代理問題，本文根據營建業特性，基於代理理論建立共同代理模式，探討營建業中小股東、大股東兼經理人，以及債權人間的代理結構，並分析的大股東兼經理人決策的因素，且嘗試提出解決代理問題的可能方式，以彌補以往文獻於探討營建業組織代理問題時，將其視為單一代理結構加以處理的不足。研究結果發現，影響營建業大股東夫經理人決策的因素為：(1)小股東及債權人監督大股東兼經理人所必須支付之單位交易成本，(2)大股東兼經理人在兩種任務上的相對生產力，(3)大股東兼經理人持股比例，以及(4)兩種任務間之互補或替代性質等。在營建業共同代理結構下，透過下列兩種方鐘，將可改善共同代理結構下對小股東及債權人所造成的可能損失；(1)營建業股東與債權人採取合作策略，共同提供誘因契約給大股東兼經理人，(2)經由其他相關參與者如政府及外部董監事提供有關營建業大東兼經理人的相關訊息。

　　　　　In view of the serious agency problems of construction industry in recent years, this study, based on common agency concept, instead of the equity agency and debt agency concepts adopted by previous studies, investigates the agency problems in construction industry. A common agency model, according to the characteristics of construction industry, is built to discuss the agency problems so as to provide way of solution. The factors which influence the manager (the large shareholder) are: firstly, the transaction cost which the small shareholder and the debt-holder incurred in the policing and monitoring the manager; secondly, the relative productivity of manager between two tasks; thirdly, the shareholding ratio of the manager; finally, the complement or substitute relationship of the task. If the manager has large shareholding ratio, two approaches can be employed to reduce the agency problems. Firstly, the small shareholders and debt-holders should adopt the cooperative strategy to provide the incentive contract. Secondly, government authorities and outside directors should strengthen the policing mechanism and provide more information related to manager to small shareholders and debt-holders.