本研究以交易成本分析與關係交換理論為基礎，探索製造商對供應商投機主義所採取的管理機制，藉以了解當製造商對供應商，個別或同時使用徵選、資產專屬性與關係規範等機制時，如何有效降低供應商的投機主義。結果發現，當製造商個別使用徵選、資產專屬性或關係規範等機制時，可以有效降低供應商的投機主義。若以關係交換理論而言，當製造商與供應商之間存有高度的關係規範時，製造商使用中度的徵選或資產專屬性的機制，最能降低供應商的投機主義。

This study explores, from the perspectives of transaction cost analysis and relational exchange theory, the governance mechanisms that a manufacturer uses to manage a supplier’s opportunism. Through this study, how the manufacturer can employ the mechanisms of selection, asset specificity, and relational norms respectively and simultaneously to mitigate the supplier’s opportunism is understood. The results indicate that the manufacturer can employ the aforementioned mechanisms respectively to reduce the supplier's opportunism. When high relational norms exist between exchange partners, from the perspective of relational exchange theory, the moderate selection and asset specificity the manufacturer implements are best to restrain the supplier’s opportunism.