本文旨在分析供應鏈內締約雙方之誘因議題與兩造間的策略互動。將締約風險、資訊盜用（misappropriation），引進賽局模型內，本文先由契約主極大化問題與Nash談判解來建構契約主的創新揭露門檻，並同時探討契約主資訊分享的決定因素。依據各種Nash談判解結果，本文進一步檢視契約主與承包商的投資決策，是否因為盜用風險而受到影響。本文最後分析資訊分享在協同供應鏈的重要性與攸關利益。 本文研究結果為：（1）在承包商沒有盜用可能性時，締約雙方與整個社會將因為契約主採取較有效率之協同供應鏈而獲得利益。（2）當存在資訊盜用風險，無論是契約主之創新揭露和外包策略，或者是締約雙方各自的投資決策，在與社會最適水準相比較後，確實顯示著扭曲現象。此外，締約雙方的談判能力將因為承包商潛在盜用而發生改變。（3）除了承包商的投機行為，消費者對於新產品之消費行為亦將會影響契約主的創新揭露決策。（4）資訊分享在協同供應鏈內確實扮演著相當重要角色；亦即，資訊分享將可有效減緩締約雙方誘因扭曲問題，並進一步提昇供應鏈整體績效。

This paper analyzes the incentives of contractors and subcontractors and explores the strategic interaction between the contracting parties in a supply chain. Specifically, we first characterize the Nash-bargaining outcomes and formulate the condition of the threshold of innovation disclosure in terms of the contractor’s maximized programs. We then use these bargaining outcomes to examine the up-front incentives of each party’s investment and explain the importance of information sharing. Our results are as follows. First, our baseline case demonstrates that in the absence of misappropriation, not only the contracting parties per se but also the society can benefit from organizing the coordinated supply chain. Second, the incentives about the contractors’ sourcing decisions and about each party’s investment decisions relative to what is socially optimal are distorted when the possibility of misappropriation exists. Moreover, the relative bargaining position between the contractor and the subcontractor has altered compared to our benchmark. Third, in addition to the misappropriation, the consumers’ characteristics also affect the contractor’s decisions on sharing innovation. Finally, our results explain the role of information sharing in resolving obstacles of coordinated supply chains and in improving supply chain performance.