旅行業業務員與經營者簽訂勞資薪資制度契約之時，雙方的契約條件會影響業務員的最適努力水準。因此，旅行業業務人員必須選擇固定底薪外加帶團或業績獎金。假設旅行業業務員與經營者以合作的態度及彼此都認為合理的勞資薪資制度契約，則雙方謀求利潤最大，互蒙其利。反之，則存在代理問題所造成的道德危險與逆選擇將日益嚴重。因此，本文的主要目的，在探討最適旅行業業務員的薪資制度，在考量內外在因素下，如何選擇底薪外加出國帶團或底薪外加業績獎金，得到最大滿足；然後業務員按照該契約的協議，決定其最適的努力水準。研究結果發現，運用選擇權訂價理論，提供一個評估旅行業業務人員最佳薪資制度評估模式，旅行業業者（委託人）應考慮的薪資結構為：底薪、獎金、帶團收入與公司治理的強弱勢。根據不同年資與業績水準；調整公司治理的強度，以達到業務人員最適表現程度，將代理成本降至最低。而旅行業業務人員（代理人）應在初期努力追求業績成長與帶團機會，早日朝長程線團體邁進，一方面培養本身銷售能力，一方面增加年所得；至於底薪方面的增長應考慮本身銷售能力，否則一直要求旅行業經營者（委託人）加薪，對自己的被轉換成本與業績壓力隨之增加。最後，本文將利用模型導出步傷害經營者情況下，旅行業業務員的預期收入，這將使得有關長期以來旅行業業務員薪資制度更臻完備。對於旅行業業務員流動率過大，旅行業領隊供需失調問題，具有正面的價值。

Salary Salary and compensation packages have been the most important incentive for employee's productivity in travel aagency management. It is also the most crucial mechanism that organizations use to attract and retain competent employees. This study utilizes agency theory in assessing the role of various factors that determine performance pay of Taiwanese salesmen within travel agencies. We address how various mixtures of the options affect the optimal salary and compensation package. We found there is trade-off relationship between severance packages and governance structures when the objective is to minimize the total cost to the travel agencies. We suggest companies adopt strong governance structrues when salesmen are motivated with option-like severance packages; otherwise salesmen will sdopt high risk policies. The results mentioned above can identify optimal salesmen's salary and compensation packages featuring basic salary, incentive compensation, tour incomes, and replacement costs. Profit-maximizing comopensation plan structures are calibrated so as to reflect salesmen specific sales force and performance.