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題名:臺灣車體損失險契約中存在之訊息不對稱問題
書刊名:臺大管理論叢
作者:汪琪玲
作者(外文):Wang, C. Kili
出版日期:2006
卷期:16:2
頁次:頁161-185
主題關鍵詞:訊息不對稱選櫻桃故事條件相關Asymmetric informationCherry-picking storyConditional correlation
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(11) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:11
  • 共同引用共同引用:14
  • 點閱點閱:23
本文分析臺灣車體損失險市場訊息不對稱問題,區分為風險型態、或風險趨避態度之訊息不對稱。除著眼新車、舊車保單有無樣本異質性,並對甲、乙、丙式保單,兩兩交叉比對。條件相關分析結果發現:三種保單間,訊息不對稱問題不盡相同。甲式和丙式或乙式和丙式車體損失險保單之間,存在風險型態的訊息不對稱;甲式和乙式車體損失險保單間,則存在選櫻桃現象。不控制新車效果所得出的推論,大致是堅實的,只是新車的訊息不對稱力量較強,差異體現在理賠金額門檻值效果上。整體樣本中,可看到保險公司隨金額加強控制理賠或核保、舊車子樣本中,則看到投保者風險趨避程度隨金額增強。研究對象的區域,亦不會大幅改變推論方向,只有程度差異而已。
This research on the asymmetric information problem in the automobile comprehensive insurance of Taiwan emphasizes on separating it into asymmetric information about risk type and asymmertic information about the risk aversion attitude. Besides on the point about the heterogeneity between new car and old car policies, we also analyze pair-wisely on the policies of type A, B and C. By conditional correlation analysis, we find quite different evidences between them: there are asymmetric information about risk type between type A and C as well as type B and C, and there is cherry picking story between type A and B. Our results are robust to the car age. The only difference is the threshold effect about the claim amount which comes from that new car get stronger asymmetric information. In the full sample, the audit ftom insurance company is more severe when the claim amount increase. In sub-sample of old car, the insured becomes more risk averse when the loss amount increases. Our conclusion also won't change by the choice of tested data area. The only difference is in the strength of their asymmetric information.
期刊論文
1.利菊秀、劉純之、葉家興(20041200)。論保險市場「訊息不對稱」理論與實證的不一致性。保險專刊,20(2),99-112。new window  延伸查詢new window
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8.Chiappori, Pierre-André、Salanié, Bernard(2000)。Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets。Journal of Political Economy,108(1),56-78。  new window
9.Dionne, Georges、Gagné, Robert(2002)。Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance。Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,24(3),213-230。  new window
10.Rothschild, M.、Stiglitz, J.(1976)。Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information。The Quarterly Journal of Economics,90(4),629-650。  new window
11.蔡英哲、曾郁仁、鄭安峰(20060400)。臺灣車體損失保險不對稱訊息的實證研究。管理學報,23(2),227-240。new window  延伸查詢new window
12.Finkelstein, A.、Poterba, J. M.(2004)。Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market。Journal of Political Economy,112(1),183-207。  new window
 
 
 
 
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