􁄣􀀡􀀡􀥍􀀡 􃦻􃠖􃘱􅲝􄆣􂖥􃉒􄚕􂸇􂹅􃓏􂃊􃇄􂂵􆈾􅸆􄤓􁇷􂮶􆑞􃲰􄿓􂋖􅲼􁇸􁧨􂅴􂙙􂇪􃉆 􄤓􃔈􅳤􁇭􃫈􃝩􄆣􂖥􃉒􄚕􂸇􂹅􄤓􄦚􃽤􁧨􂅉􆫭􃉒􆧗􃢾􂂏􄿓􄍉􂄕􅱲􃼉􆋸􃑘􂟞􆫛􁧨 􅀢􂮸􃝖􃳮􂓅􄞱􄞮􄤓􅽖􅲙􅣤􄚕􂣷􁇭􄆣􂖥􃉒􄚕􂸇􂹅􃙟􂒉􄤓􁇷􂮶􆑞􃲰􄿓􂋖􅲼􁇸􁧨 􂃊􃇄􃉒􆧗􃢾􄟀􂮶􆑞􂮸􄞮􄤓􁇬􄔈􃸙􄥽􄤓􄤓􅲗􄸦􃳮􂓅􁧨􂄵􂘂􁇷􃲰􄿓􁇸􁧨􃓏􄿓􃒟 􄤓􁧤􆋣􄓍􃠖􃆞􃲰􄿓􁧥􁇭􃫈􃝩􂮶􆑞􃲰􄿓􂋖􅲼􁧨􃉒􆧗􅴜􄩴􄿟􃱚􂖔􃕻􂄕􂛷􆌙􄾊􅀀 􅒖􂂼􂮽􆋚􄲚􁧨􂏷􆍷􁧤􃒥􄿤􂮶􆍷􂆌􁧥􆎌􃢾􅵥􂩮􄔈􂸩􄤓􃲰􄿓􂖥􄿟􃱚􁇭􂥯􃷳􁧨􂂼 􂮽􆋚􄲚􃦘􃓏􅶑􄤓􁇷􂂼􂮽􃲰􄿓􁇸􁧤􃒥􃰑􃊄􃲰􄿓􁧥􁇭􄏅􅊛􃷳􂂏􂋖􅲼􅒖􂇪􃉆􄤓􃲰 􄿓􂖥􂃊􃇄􄦇􂺜􄵚􁇭􂇪􃉆􅴜􄍉􅼯􅼻􃰑􃊄􄞱􄞮􁇬􂉰􃊄􃇱􃒟􁇬􂇫􃘷􅵥􅒖􃼉􄷥􄤓􂂼 􂮽􆋚􄲚􃢾􆧭􃲰􄿓􂖥􁇬􆁷􅵥􂩮􃆞􄤓􄿟􃱚􁇭􂅥􂂵􃙟􂒉􂂏􂏗􆳦􅵥􅷘􃔈􅳤􂮶􆑞􃲰􄿓 􂋖􅲼􆧱􅑷􁇷􆇇􂏴􂟞􆫛􁇸􁇭

Abstract This paper was about the Massive Modularity Hypothesis (MMH) and Fodor’s a priori objection to it. Evolutionary psychologists develop and defend the MMH, arguing that the mind is a set of information-processing mechanisms that were selected for to solve adaptive problems our hunter-gatherer ancestors faced. According to this hypothesis, our cognitive architecture, including the part that subserves central processing, is largely or perhaps even entirely composed of modules, computational mechanisms that are innate and domain-specific. This hypothesis, however, seems to run counter to Fodor’s idea of modularity. Fodor argues that central mechanisms such as concept forming, belief fixation, reasoning, and decision making are non-modular and domain general. He gives an a priori argument pointing out that the MMH faces an “input problem.” I argued in this paper that although Fodor’s argument may have established the idea that there are inevitably non-modular central mechanisms,he has not shown that the sort of central mechanisms evolutionary psychologists have proposed is non-modular and domain general. My discussion was mainly on the empirical evidence and theories evolutionary psychologists have for their Darwinian modules, in particular, the cheater-detection mechanisms in use in solving the deontic conditional reasoning problems people have often encountered in daily life. Fodor’s argument does not succeed in rejecting the MMH.