企業垂直結合雖可提升垂直結合效率，達到維持競爭優勢之目的，但對特定市場亦有產生市場封鎖不利益，減損競爭效能之虞。如何平衡這二種因素，以產生競爭效果，現有結合文獻僅有少許理論性探討，尚未發現有實證驗證者。因此本研究仍以台灣公平會1992年至2006年所審理的垂直結合個案作為樣本，經由內容分析法及SEM等分析方法進行驗證，結果顯示，垂直結合效率與競爭效果間之正向結構係數大於市場封鎖不利益與競爭效果間之負向結構係數；在法律類型上，競爭效果高低依序為「收購」、「合併及控制」、「委託」，其中除「合併」與「控制」未達顯著水準外，其餘達到顯著水準；另外，同業間垂直結合競爭效果高於跨業間垂直結合。這些結果與既有的理論文獻相符合，一方面可使這些理論文獻得到驗證，對垂直結合策略之實務運用亦有幫助。

It is true that the vertical combination of enterprises can enhance the vertical combination efficiencies, to achieve the goal of sustaining competitive advantages. At the same time, it may produce disadvantages of market foreclosure to reduce competitive efficiencies on the specify market. How to balance the two forces to get competitive effects, excepting a little theoretical exploration, these have not been examined in any empirical study previously. Thus, using a research sample of the cases of vertical combination from Taiwan Fair Trade Commission between 1992 and 2006, this study conduced by a content analysis and SEM etc. analytical methods to validate the data. The results confirm a positive structural coefficient between vertical combination efficiencies and competitive effects is more than a negative structural coefficient between disadvantages of market foreclosure and competitive effects, the competitive effect of law's categories from high to low is "acquisition", "merger and control", "trust" and excepting between merger and control does not reach significantly, the others reach significant level. The competitive effect of the same industry is more than cross-industry does. These results correspond with existent theoretical documents and those can be used to validate, may also help vertical combination strategies usefulness of a practice.