威廉斯(Meredith Williams)認為我們可以利用後期維根斯坦(Ludwig Wittgenstein)哲學中其所謂的「背景瞭解」(background understanding)，來反駁蒯因(W. V. Quine)有關翻譯與指稱的「不確定說」。在她看來構成「背景瞭解」的一部份的有關東西屬或不屬同一類的所謂的基本判斷，因為不是或不能是詮釋或翻譯的對象，因此可以避開蒯因所說的「不確定性」。她也認為「背景瞭解」讓我們可以從眾多的可能性中，選出我們的語言所真正涉及的存有論，因此我們的語言的指稱與意義就不會有「不確定性」的情況。本文所要說明的是，一方面威廉斯所說的基本判斷其實無法避開「不確定性」的困擾，而「背景瞭解」也不能幫助我們選出我們的語言的所謂真正涉及的存有論。由此可見，維根斯坦的「背景瞭解」與蒯因的「不確定說」的成立與否，並沒有像威廉斯所認為的那樣有那麼直接的關係，讓我們可以利用「背景瞭解」來說明蒯因所說的「不確定說」是不成立的。

Meredith Williams thinks that what she calls the 'background Understanding' in later Wittgenstein can be used to refute W. V. Quine's theses of the indeterminacies of translation and reference. For this she first points out that the so-called basic judgments of sameness, unlike other judgments, are not interpretable, hence not subject to Quine's indeterminacies. She also thinks that the background understanding can help us single out from among other alternatives what our words really refer to. In this paper we will argue that the basic judgments of sameness, due to their sharing of words with other judgments, are subject to interpretation, hence to Quine's indeterminacies. We will also point out that the background understanding can in no way privilege a certain ontology as the actual or intended ontology of our language. So, contrary to what Williams would want us to believe, there is no direct route from the background understanding to a refutation of Quine's indeterminacy theses.