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題名:汽車保險不明車損的誘發性理賠--臺灣的實證分析
書刊名:經濟論文
作者:利菊秀 引用關係彭盛昌劉純之 引用關係
作者(外文):Li, Chu-shiuPeng, Sheng-changLiu, Chwen-chi
出版日期:2008
卷期:36:3
頁次:頁249-275
主題關鍵詞:汽車保險道德危險不明車損Automobile insuranceMoral hazardUnknown peril
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(4) 博士論文(1) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:3
  • 共同引用共同引用:17
  • 點閱點閱:40
本文以台灣汽車保險車體損失險的甲式保單為對象,驗證誘發性理賠的經濟效果,探討不明車損的保障是否會產生顯著的理賠誘因。研究發現,甲式保單中不明車損的保障,的確含有誘發性理賠的作用,而此現象主要是透過保單到期前一個月之理賠模式來進行。實證結果顯示,保單到期前會以不明車損申請理賠者的特性有:駕駛人的特微與要保人的特微一致、理賠係數較低、理賠後在同一家保險公司的續保率較高,這些都與在其他保單月份之理賠案的現象不同,但都符合誘發性理賠的特性。而理賠動機有可能是消費者利用不明車損浮濫申報,以收回部分保費支出,也可能是累積小額理賠暫不申報,直到期末才一次理賠以避免理賠次數過多影響續保保費。本文的研究,驗證了特定項目的保障可能引發負面的動機效果之事實。
This paper tests the economic effect of unknown perils coverage in automobile insurance on claim behavior in Taiwan. In terms of filing claims in the last month before contracts expire, the insured are found to overuse the insurance coverage of unknown perils. The empirical evidence reveals that some characteristics of the claimants who file the claims in the last policy month are different from that of those who file claims in the alternative months. As a special insurance contract is permitted to reimburse the insured with the claimed loss without requiring any verification, unknown perils coverage does create significant incentive to file excessive claims at the end of policy period.
期刊論文
1.Abbring, J. H.、Chiappori, P.、Pinquet, J.(2003)。Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data。Journal of the European Economic Association,1(4),767-820。  new window
2.Li, C.-S.、Liu, C.-C、Yeh, J.-H.(2007)。The Incentive Effects of Increasing Per-Claim Deductible Contracts in Automobile Insurance。Journal of Risk and Insurance,74(2),441-459。  new window
3.Wang, J. L.、Chung, C.-F.、Tzeng, L. Y.(2008)。An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Increasing Deductibles on Moral Hazard。Journal of Risk and Insurance,75(3),551-566。  new window
4.Pauly, Mark V.(1968)。The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment。American Economic Review,58(3),531-537。  new window
5.Chiappori, P.、Durand, F.、Geoffard, P.(1998)。Moral Hazard and the Demand for Physician Services: First Lessons from a French Natural Experiment。European Economic Review,42,499-511。  new window
6.Riphahn, R. T.、Wambach, A.、Million, A.(2003)。Incentive Effects in the Demand for Health Care: A Bivariate Panel Count Data Estimation。Journal of Applied Econometrics,18(4),387-405。  new window
7.Shavell, Steven(1979)。On Moral Hazard and Insurance。The Quarterly Journal of Economics,93(4),541-562。  new window
8.Chiappori, Pierre-André、Salanié, Bernard(2000)。Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets。Journal of Political Economy,108(1),56-78。  new window
9.Arrow, Kenneth J.(1963)。Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care。The American Economic Review,53(5),941-973。  new window
10.汪琪玲(20061200)。臺灣車體損失險上的動機效果。臺大管理論叢,17(1),31-57。new window  延伸查詢new window
11.汪琪玲(20060600)。臺灣車體損失險契約中存在之訊息不對稱問題。臺大管理論叢,16(2),161-185。new window  延伸查詢new window
12.蔡英哲、曾郁仁、鄭安峰(20060400)。臺灣車體損失保險不對稱訊息的實證研究。管理學報,23(2),227-240。new window  延伸查詢new window
13.Richaudeau, D.(1999)。Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using Individual Data。Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,24,97-114。  new window
14.Dionne, G.、Gagné, R.(2002)。Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance。Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,24,213-230。  new window
15.Boyer, M.、Dionne, G.(1989)。An Empirical Analysis of Moral Hazard and Experience Rating。The Review of Economics and Statistics,71,128-134。  new window
16.Dionne, G.、Gagné, R.(2001)。Deductible Contracts against Fraudulent Claims: An Empirical Evidence in Automobile Insurance。The Review of Economics and Statistics,83,290-301。  new window
17.Cohen, A.(2005)。Asymmetric Information and Learning: Evidence from the Automobile Insurance Market。The Review of Economics and Statistics,87,197-207。  new window
會議論文
1.Li, C.-S.、Liu, C.-C.、Peng, S.-C.(2007)。Measuring Automobile Insurance Fraud in Taiwan。0。  new window
2.曾郁仁、Wang, J. L.、Wang, K. C.、Wang, J.-H.(2007)。Provider-induced Asymmetric Information in the Insurance Market。0。  new window
 
 
 
 
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