In Plato's Theaetetus 201d-206b, when Socrates is ready to crossexamine the definition of knowledge that 'true belief "with an account (logos)" is knowledge,' he states and explores the so-called 'Dream Theory.' According to the theory, things are classified into two kinds complexes and elements. Complexes consist of elements and can be divided into elements, while elements cannot be divided further, just as atoms. For complexes we can have an account, while for elements we can have only bare names. Within the context of that 'true belief "with an account" is knowledge,' complexes are knowable, while elements are not. To examine the theory, Socrates argues in a dilemma whether a complex is the same as all elements within it or a complex has a single form which is something other than all elements within it. Having examined both the horns of the dilemma, Socrates refutes the theory. In this paper, I wish to show Plato's interesting analysis on the relations among language, things and cognition in this passage. In the light of the, I will show his re t1ection on the identification of the whole with its parts, and on the epistemological foundationalism. Further, it will be shown that Plato does not accept the identification of the whole with its parts and would hold a critical view of epistemological foundationalism.