本研究嘗試以道德危機遑論為基礎，建立一個兩期的模型，討論有關不同情境之下，中央銀行的紓困決策以反資本適足性與存款保險制度的調整等銀行監理的問題。研究發現，最適的資本適足率與存款保險金貴率應與銀行放款成功的期望機率成反比；顯示實務上對不同經營管理效率的銀行應實施差別性的存款保險及資本適足率等銀行監理制度。

This study tries to establish a two-period moral hazard model to investigate the problems such as the central bank's bailout decision, capital adequacy and deposit insurance under various scenarios. It is found that the optimal capital requirement ratio and the deposit insurance ratio are decreasing with the expected success probability of bank's loan project, these results exhibit that the optimal capitat requirement ratio and the deposit insurance ratio should be discriminate with respect to the banks' operating efficiency.