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題名:經理人持股、內線交易、監督與公司價值
書刊名:經濟論文
作者:韓千山 引用關係孫嘉宏 引用關係陳儀嘉
作者(外文):Han, Chien-shanSun, Chia-hungChen, Yi-jia
出版日期:2010
卷期:38:2
頁次:頁245-291
主題關鍵詞:代理問題監督內線交易Agency problemMonitoringInsider trading
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(3) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:3
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:40
期刊論文
1.Ausubel, M. Ausubel(1990)。Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy。The American Economic Review,80(5),1022–1041。  new window
2.Mirrlees, J.(1976)。The Optimal Structure of Incentive and Authority within an Organization。The Bell Journal of Economics,7(1),105-131。  new window
3.Zingales, L.(1994)。The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience。The Review of Financial Studies,7(1),125-148。  new window
4.Holmström, Bengt、Tirole, Jean(1993)。Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring。The Journal of Political Economy,101(4),678-709。  new window
5.Holmström, Bengt(1982)。Moral Hazard in Teams。The Bell Journal of Economics,13(2),324-340。  new window
6.Murphy, K. M.、Shleifer, A.、Vishny, R. W.(1989)。Industrialization and the Big Push。Quarterly Journal of Economics,97,1003-1026。  new window
7.Pagano, Marco、Röell, Ailsa(1998)。The choice of stock ownership structure: Agency costs monitoring and the decision to go public。Quarterly Journal of Economics,113(1),187-225。  new window
8.Burkart, Mike、Gromb, Denis、Panunzi, Fausto(1997)。Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm。The Quarterly Journal of Economics,112(3),693-728。  new window
9.Shleifer, Andrei、Vishny, Robert W.(1986)。Large shareholders and corporate control。Journal of Political Economy,94(3 Part 1),461-488。  new window
10.Demsetz, Harold、Villalonga, Belén(2001)。Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance。Journal of Corporate Finance,7(3),209-233。  new window
11.Hölmstrom, Bengt(1979)。Moral Hazard and Observability。The Bell Journal of Economics,10(1),74-91。  new window
12.Fama, Eugene F.(1980)。Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm。Journal of Political Economy,88(2),288-307。  new window
13.Jensen, Michael C.(1986)。Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers。The American Economic Review,76(2),323-329。  new window
14.Ross, Stephen A.(1973)。The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem。The American Economic Review,63(2),134-139。  new window
15.Jensen, Michael C.、Meckling, William H.(1976)。Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure。Journal of Financial Economics,3(4),305-360。  new window
16.Aghion, P. and J. Tirole(1997)。“Formal and Authority in Organization,”。Journal of Political Economy,105,1–29。  new window
17.Bebchuk, L. A. and C. Fershtman(1993)。“The Effects of Insider Trading on Insiders’ Effort in Good and Bad Times,”。European Journal of Political Economy,9,469–481。  new window
18.Bebchuk, L. A. and C. Fershtman(1994)。“Insider Trading and the Managerial Choice among Risky Projects,”。Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,29,1–14。  new window
19.Chen, M. Y.(2006)。“Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: An Analysis Using Switching Simultaneous-Equations Models,”。Applied Economics,38,161–181。  new window
20.Dye, R. A.(1984)。“Inside Trading and Incentives,”。Journal of Business,57,295–313。  new window
21.Manove, M.(1989)。“The Harm from Insider Trading and Informed Speculation,”。Quarterly Journal of Economics,104,823–846。  new window
22.Stiglitz, J. E.(1975)。Incentives, Risk, and Information: Notes towards a Theory of Hierarchy。The Bell Journal of Economics,6(2),552-579。  new window
圖書
1.Baumol, W. J.(1959)。Business Behavior, Value and Growth。New York:MacMillan。  new window
2.Williamson, Oliver E.(1964)。The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm。Prentice-Hall。  new window
3.Manne, Henry G.(1966)。Insider Trading and the Stock Market。New York:The Free Press。  new window
4.Burrough, Bryan、Helyar, John(1990)。Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabisco。Harper & Row。  new window
 
 
 
 
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