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題名:取消唯物論的困局
書刊名:華梵人文學報
作者:冀劍制 引用關係
作者(外文):Chi, Chien-chih
出版日期:2009
卷期:12
頁次:頁25-54
主題關鍵詞:取消唯物論意識心靈自閉症Eliminative materialismConsciousnessMindAutism
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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雖然當今科學一般相信心靈由大腦的運作所產生,但我們卻無法用描述大腦活動的物理概念完全解釋心靈概念或心靈現象,這是所謂的心之不可化約性問題。依據由瑟爾,耐格,以及傑克森所提出的心之不可化約性論證,物理論或所謂的唯物論所主張的「物質是唯一的存在」的說法似乎就面臨挑戰了。既然心靈現象無法被物理概念所化約,我們該如何看待這些不可化約的心靈現象呢?取消唯物論主張,這些不可化約的心靈現象根本不存在,我們使用了幾千年的語言與概念框架讓我們誤以爲它們的存在,所以,取消唯物論處理心之不可化約性問題的方法就是把這些不可化約的心靈現象從存在事物的名單中刪除。這個說法雖然在理論上有其說服力,但是,這個取消唯物論論證卻有反例存在-就是自閉症兒童的認知現象。
The mind is irreducible to the physical. This means that we cannot use physical concepts to completely explain the mind. While we believe that the mental is generated by the physical, it seems that we should be able to use physical concepts to thoroughly explain the mind. Searle, Nagel, and Jackson present arguments to show that we fail to do so. Thus, we encounter the problem of the irreducibility of the mind. According to these arguments, this problem implies that materialism (or physicalism) is wrong. However, Paul Churchland's eliminative materialism can still survive this attack. In this paper, I will discuss this debate and point out that although Churchland's argument can survive the attack, it is still problematic; there is a counterexample for Churchland's argument. That is children with autism.
期刊論文
1.Wimmer, H.、Perner, J.(1983)。Beliefs about beliefs:Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception。Cognition,13,103-128。  new window
2.Chalmers, D. J.(1995)。The Puzzle of Conscious Experience。Scientific American,Winter,30-37。  new window
3.Jackson, F.(1986)。What Mary didn't Know?。Journal of Philosophy,83,291-295。  new window
4.Churchland, Paul M.(1985)。Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States。The Journal of Philosophy,82(1),8-28。  new window
5.Baron-Cohen, Simon、Spitz, Amy、Cross, Pippa(1993)。Do children with autism recognise surprise? A research note。Cognition and Emotion,7(6),507-516。  new window
6.Baron-Cohen, S.、Leslie, A. M.、Frith, U.(1986)。Mechanical, behavioral and intentional understanding of picture stories in autistic children。British Journal of Development Psychology,4,113-125。  new window
7.Churchland, P. M.(1981)。Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes。The Journal of Philosophy,78(2),67-90。  new window
8.Nagel, Thomas(1974)。What is it like to be a bat?。The Philosophical Review,83(4),435-450。  new window
9.Dennett, D. C.(1978)。“Beliefs about Beliefs.”。Behavior and Brain Sciences,4,568-570。  new window
圖書
1.Churchland, P. M.(1984)。Matter and Consciousness。Cambridge, Massachusetts:The MIT Press。  new window
2.Searle, John R.(1998)。Mind, Language and Society。Basic Books。  new window
3.Chalmers, David J.(1996)。The Conscious Mind。Oxford:Oxford University Press。  new window
4.Baron-Cohen, Simon(1995)。Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind。London:MIT Press。  new window
5.Dennett, Daniel Clement(1991)。Consciousness Explained。Boston:Little, Brown and Company。  new window
6.Searle, J. R.(1992)。The Rediscovery of the Mind。Cambridge, Massachusetts:The MIT Press。  new window
7.Searle, John Rogers(1997)。The Mystery of Consciousness。New York:A New York Review Book。  new window
8.Landau, Barbara、Gleitman, Lila R.(1985)。Language and Experience: Evidence from the Blind Child。Havard University Press。  new window
9.Leslie, Alan. M.(1991)。‘The Theory of Mind Impair ment in Autism: Evidence for a Modular Mechanism of Development?。Natural theories of Mind。Basil。  new window
10.Wellman, H.(1985)。The Child’s Theory of Mind: The development of conceptions of cognition。Growth of Reflection in Children。  new window
 
 
 
 
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