􀒁􁍕􀐎􁁂􁃙􁍕􁛾􁗨􀸅􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􁃹􀖖􀰷􀜄􀶜􀙮􀞑􁇟􀽀􁏢􁗋􁆉􀐷􀎓􁅈􀽀􀇴􀕠 􁃴􁈞􀎢􀙠􀒂􁘍􀲥􀬯􀻘􀖖􀰷􀜄􀞑􀖚􁘋􀇶􀒗􀜭􀐬􀮭􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􀚩􀚁􁟸􀒓􀘳􀲍􀔛􀥶􀱛 􁍕􀞑􀦣􁏢􀧎􀥺􀇴􀑅􀡴􀚻􁉺􀇸􀤣􀧱 (Kit Fine) 􀚩􀓭􀔯􀑭􀕬􀇸􀩇􀷉 (Dominic Hyde) 􀳿􁇡􀣁􁗨􀸅􀬯􀻘􀖖􀰷􀜄􀞑􁋴􀓸􀓧􀇴􀕠􀢂􀬯􀻘􀖖􀰷􀜄􁃹􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􀙠􀏌􀽮􀳷􀔋􀖚 􁘋􀇶􀕠􀢂􀇴􀗚􁇡􀣁􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􀛹􀺎􀬯􀻘􀖖􀰷􀜄􀞑􀸼􀱣􀙠􀏌􀔋􀑄􀇴􀎨􀵩􀢂􁇥􀇴􀬯 􀻘􀖖􀰷􀜄􀏝􁙑􀢂􀡑􁀾􀞑􀭢􁚒􀇶􀣁􀎑􀫈􀭼􀱛􁀾􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􁆶􀬯􀻘􀖖􀰷􀜄􀞑􁜢􀟯􀇴 􀥨􀓃􀇴􀗚􀮒􀏩􀕱􁇥􀜴􀬯􀻘􀖖􀰷􀜄􀐰􀏷􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􀓵􀕖􀡌􁄬􀚁􁇟􀽀􁏢􀇶􀯗􀎠􀙰􀤾 􁋂􀰮􀞑􀟾􀢂􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􀣁􀕖􀏝􀸅􀽮􁎁􁁶􀬯􀻘􀖖􀰷􀜄􀞑􀭢􁚒􀇶􀴨􀡕􀓧􁍕􀐎􀏍􀤾􀖇 􀱜􀞑􀟾􀢂􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􀙠􀒂􁀾􀘌􀬯􀻘􀖖􀰷􀜄􀞑􀭢􁚒􀇶􀒗􀜭􀾽􀐶􀣴􀘲􀖖􀰷􀜄􁝼􁚒􀞑 􀓚􁅿􀱛􁍕􀇴􀬨􀎑􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􁆶􀚁􁟸􀒓􀔛􀥶􀱛􁍕􀏐􀑦􀇴􀚁􀐴􀺾􁁡􀓵􀶜􀛅􀶮􀇸􀠶􀼹 􀷄 (Timothy Williamson) 􀞑􀞕􁄊􀱛􁍕􀐰􀏷􁛥􀣑􀦿􀇸􀧃􀞳 (Rosanna Keefe) 􀞑􁇟 􀒔􁍕􀇴􀎨􀳿􁖂􁆀􀚩􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􀔖􀹱􀣬􀓕􀹈􁄬􀞑􁇟􀽀􁏢􀇴􀜌􀐰􀇴􁇥􀜴􀺬􀥶􀱛􁍕􀞑 􁇟􀽀􁏢􀚩􁁀􀱛􁍕􀑑􀫈􁎁􁁶􀞑􀭢􁚒􀇴􁡉􀸅􀢂􀳀􀱛􀖖􀰷􀜄􁝼􁚒􀥙􀤾􀞑􀬆􁗺􀇶

Abstract The aim of this paper is to show that while supervaluationism provides a satisfactory semantics of vagueness, ipso facto the challenge of explaining higher-order vagueness still remains. Kit Fine􀉡the first one to propose super-truth theory (i.e., the prototype of supervaluationism) 􀉡 and Dominic Hyde 􀉡 defender of subvaluationism􀉡both contend that higher-order vagueness does not matter. I respectfully beg to differ and propose to argue that higher-order vagueness is not just a pseudo-problem and that we still need to need to formulate a satisfactory account. In making my case, first of all, I analyze the structure of higher-order vagueness and the basic functions of supervaluationism, respectively, then go on to indicate the main strategy deployed by the supervaluationists in dealing with higher-order vagueness. Again, I don’t think that they have so far provided a satisfactory account that solves the problem. That is to say, while supervalutionists indeed propose a good semantics of vagueness in general, but they have not provided a solution to the higher-order vagueness problem. Supervaluationism plays a crucial role in well-known contemporary theories of vagueness, including the epistemic theory and the pragmatic theory as well as subvaluationism itself. Advocates of such theories all claim to share the same pattern of approach with supervaluationism, thus, it is crucial to discuss the structure and problems of supervaluationism in order to tackle the problem of higher-order vagueness.