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題名:論耐格對意識問題的觀點
書刊名:思與言
作者:冀劍制
作者(外文):Chi, Chien-chih
出版日期:2010
卷期:48:3
頁次:頁97-130
主題關鍵詞:意識化約耐格擴展論ConsciousnessReductionNagelExpansionism
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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意識的問題又可稱之為心之不可化約性問題,這個問題簡單的說就是「我們無法使用物理或科學概念來解釋意識」,另一個說法就是「心靈概念無法被物理概念所化約」。在這個問題的說明上,耐格提出著名的蝙蝠論證指出,無論我們對蝙蝠的大腦有多瞭解,我們都不可能知道作為一個蝙蝠的感覺是什麼。另外,在分析這個問題方面,耐格指出,此問題的根源在於第一人稱的觀點與第三人稱的觀點之間無法溝通。而針對這個問題的解決方向上,耐格提出擴展論,主張我們目前對心靈與物質的瞭解都是正確的但卻是不足的,我們必須增加對心物的瞭解,進而發現它們之間的必然關聯,然後藉由這個必然關聯的發現,發展出新的概念或概念框架來解決這個問題。本文將針對耐格對意識問題的觀點深入分析與討論。
The problem of consciousness is also called the problem of the irreducibility of the mind, which means that we encounter a problem when we try to use physical concepts to explain consciousness. In other words, mental concepts are not reducible to physical concepts. For explaining this problem, Nagel argues that no matter how much we understand a bat’s brain, it is impossible for us to know what it is like to be a bat. In addition, Nagel argues that the problem is generated by the inconsistence between the first-person point of view and the third-person point of view. Mental concepts are understood through the first-person point of view and physical concepts are understood through the third-person point of view. These points of views form two different conceptual frameworks which cannot completely communicate with each other. In order to find a way to solve the problem of consciousness, Nagel presents expansionism, which suggests that, our understanding of the mental and the physical is basically correct, but not complete. We have to improve our understanding by finding the necessary connection between the metal and the physical. According to the connection, we will produce a new conceptual framework to solve this problem. In this paper, I will analyze and discuss these views.
期刊論文
1.Chalmers, D.、Jackson, F.(2001)。Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation。Philosophical Review,110,315-360。  new window
2.Nagel, T.(1998)。Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem。Philosophy,73(285),337-352。  new window
3.Nagel, Thomas(1974)。What is it like to be a bat?。The Philosophical Review,83(4),435-450。  new window
4.McGinn, Colin(1989)。Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?。Mind,98,349-366。  new window
圖書
1.Chomsky, Noaxn(2000)。New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。  new window
2.Johnston, Victor(1999)。Why We Feel: The Science of Human Emotions。Reading, Massachusetts:Perseus Books。  new window
3.Murphy, Nancey(1998)。Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues。Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature。Minneapolis, MN:Fortress Press。  new window
4.Norman Kemp Smith、Kant, Immanuel(1781)。Critique of Pure Reason。Amherst, NY:St. Martin’s Press。  new window
5.Chalmers, David J.(1997)。The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory。Oxford:Oxford University Press。  new window
6.Searle, J. R.(1992)。The Rediscovery of the Mind。Cambridge, Massachusetts:The MIT Press。  new window
7.Searle, John R.(1995)。The Construction of Social Reality。New York:Free Press。  new window
8.Nagel, Thomas(1986)。The View from Nowhere。Oxford University Press。  new window
9.Nagel, Thomas(1997)。The Last World。New York。  new window
10.Nagel, Thomas(2002)。The Psychophysical Nexus。Concealment and Exposureand Other Essays。New York。  new window
11.Thomas, Alan(2009)。Thomas Nagel, Ithaca。NY。  new window
 
 
 
 
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