傳統上認為，柏拉圖使用「對話」來書寫哲學，是因為書寫只能「間接」呈現哲學，模仿口說問答寫成的「對話錄」，最能接近真正的哲學。本文所要釐清的是，雖然柏拉圖的確指出了書寫的侷限，但在立場上他並不排斥書寫，也不排斥「間接」。「間接對話」的書寫形式便是這一立場的證據。因為，這種書寫形式非但不爭取「直接」，反而更凸顯書寫固有的「間接」性。《泰鄂提得斯》便是一例。以此，本文將分析《泰鄂提得斯》的開場段落，為柏拉圖在「書寫」議題上的哲學立場建立新解釋，重新審視讀者「間接」藉由閱讀哲學書寫來進行哲學活動的意義。

Traditionally, Plato’s use of the form of dialogue is interpreted as an imitation of oral conversation. In order to display philosophy as directly as possible, the form of dialogue imitates a process of question and answer. The underlying thinking is that the direct philosophical activity is oral, and any written dialogue can at best represent philosophy indirectly. That is, the form of dialogue shows that Plato tries to avoid the “indirectness” which is inherent in writing. In this paper, I will revise the above view and argue that, though Plato complains about writing in the Phaedrus and Letter VII, he does not avoid writing, nor does he exclude indirectness. His use of the form of indirect dialogue highlights the indirectness of written words, and provides a counter-example to the traditional interpretation. By “indirect dialogue,” I mean the dialogue does not enter its main substantial discussion directly, but lets the substantial part be read or retold by someone else indirectly. The Theaetetus is one example. Here I will analyze its opening plot to explore Plato’s transgression of the boundary between speaking and writing. The form of indirect dialogue works as an experiment which breaks a fixed prejudice against writing and indirectness, and helps us to reflect on Plato’s activity of writing philosophy and our own activity of reading philosophy.