Japanese judiciary has been described as passive or self-restrained in judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan has declared statutes to be unconstitutional in only eight cases since 1947. Among explanations of Japanese court’s self-restraint, this paper focuses judicial appointment. Attention is paid to the judicial reform in the early 21st century, particularly the setting up of the Lower Court Judges Nominating Consultation Commission, which was established in 2003. This paper tries to answer the question: “Does the judicial reform in the early 21st century have an impact on constitutional review?’’ by taking a socio-legal approach. Consideration is made on four sections: (II) adoption of the Constitution after World War II; (III) procedure of judicial appointment in the second half of the 20th century; (IV) judicial reform and birth of the Lower Court Judges Nominating Consultation Commission in the early 21st century, and (V) effectiveness of recent judicial reform on judicial activism. In conclusion, the answer to the question is that the judicial reform in the early 21st century does not seem to have an impact on judicial review. There are mainly three backgrounds: separation of powers in postwar Japan with little checks and balances, the persistence of arbitrary judicial personnel management within the court, and an ideology of “nameless faceless judiciary.” A few signs of change have been emerging, among others, a change of power from the LDP to the Democratic Party; however, judicial appointment in itself does not seem to have an impact on judicial review in Japan.