Feminist writer Melinda Vadas attempts an original defense of the view that pornography is itself the subordination based on sex which differentially harms women. In order to argue that women's being treated as a subordinated class is directly and relevantly related to producing or disseminating pornography, she draws the distinction between that which may and may not be imputed to the agents of faulty actions from Joel Feinberg's theory of responsibility. In this paper, I will argue that Vadas may not recognize that the causal relevance for pornography and women's being treated as a subordinated class exists only in our practice of sexuality; in order to go beyond this, she has to utilize the principle of the priority of the practice of sexuality. But we have yet to be given any reason for supposing that the principle of the priority of the practice of sexuality is tenable. Consequently we have as yet no reason to accept Vadas's account of the wrongness of producing or disseminating pornography.