哈特經分析而認定，法理學中存在一個功利主義傳統，並將之與傑瑞米‧邊沁和約翰‧奧斯丁聯繫在一起。這一傳統秉持三個學說，即法律與道德是分離的，對法律概念要進行分析，從理論上來審視，法律是命令。與哈特相反，我認為，不管是就法律理論與道德的分離而言，還是就法律與道德的分離而言，對法律，邊沁並沒有採納一個「實證主義的」構想方案。哈特嘗試為法律體系提供一個道德中立的描述，由於他錯誤地解讀了邊沁的語言分析進路，所以他錯誤地認為，邊沁的法理學建構是他這一嘗試的先驅。正是這個假定導致了哈特在《論一般法律》的編輯中屢屢犯錯。邊沁的功利主義法理學應當被認定是普通法理論與自然法理論的一個替代性理論。

Hart identified a utilitarian tradition in jurisprudence, which he associated with Jeremy Bentham and John Austin. This tradition consisted in three doctrines: the separation of law and morals; the analysis of legal concepts; and the imperative theory of law. I argue, contrary to Hart, that Bentham did not adopt a ‘positivist’ conception of law whether understood in terms of the separation of legal theory and morality or in terms of the separation of law and morals. Misinterpreting Bentham’s approach to the analysis of language, Hart was wrong to assume that Bentham’s jurisprudential project was a precursor to his own attempt to provide a morally neutral description of a legal system. It was this assumption that led to mistakes in Hart’s editing of Of Laws in General. Bentham’s utilitarian theory of law should be recognized as a distinct alternative to Common Law and Natural Law theories.