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題名:推論證成與遵循規則
書刊名:國立臺灣大學哲學論評
作者:何志青 引用關係
作者(外文):Ho, Jih-ching
出版日期:2009
卷期:38
頁次:頁63-90
主題關鍵詞:推論證成無限後退InferenceJustificationInfinite regress
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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傳統知識論接受推論之證成概念:一信念的證成是藉由其他的信念(或狀態)合理推出該信念。推論證成立即導致「無限後退」的問題,因為具證成能力的信念(或狀態)本身亦需要被證成。本文嘗試提出不會無限後退的推論證成。首先分析傳統推論證成理論具有三原則:狹義推理理論,形式主義的推理概念,以及單線後退的證成方向。此三原則必須被修正,並取代之以新原則:廣義推理理論、實質主義、平衡互動的證成方向。這些原則所組成的新推論證成理論不再有無限後退的問題。
Traditional epistemology embraces an inferential concept of justification: a belief is justified just in case it can be reasonably inferred from other beliefs. Inferential justification immediately incurs the problem of infinite regress, since the justifying beliefs themselves are in need of further justification. In this paper I will try to explicate a new idea of inferential justification that does not regress indefinitely. I will begin by analyzing the traditional notion of inferential justification as involving three principles, namely narrow inferentialism, formalism, and linear regress justification. All three principles are critically examined, and in their place, three new ones are proposed: broad inferentialism, materialism, and interactive justification. The principles constitute a new inferential approach which admits of no infinite regress.
期刊論文
1.BonJour, Laurence(1978)。Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?。American Philosophical Quarterly,15,1-13。  new window
2.McDowell, John(2002)。Knowledge and the Internal Revisited。Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,64(1),97-106。  new window
3.McDowell, John(1998)。Having the world in view: Sellars, Kant, and intentionality。Journal of Philosophy,95(9),431-491。  new window
4.Carroll, Lewis(1895)。What the Tortoise Said to Achilles。Mind,4(14),278-280。  new window
圖書
1.Dummett, Michael(1973)。Frege: Philosophy of Language。Cambridge:Harvard University Press。  new window
2.McDowell, John(1996)。Mind and World。Harvard University Press。  new window
3.Wittgenstein, L.(1953)。Philosophical Investigation。New York. NY:Macmillan。  new window
4.Sellars, Wilfrid、Brandom, R.(1997)。Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind。Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press。  new window
5.Brandom, Robert B.(1994)。Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment。Harvard University Press。  new window
6.Brandom, Robert(2000)。Articulating Reaosns: An Introduction to inferentialism。Cambridge:Harvard University Press。  new window
圖書論文
1.Chisholm, Roderick(1964)。The Myth of Given。Philosophy。  new window
2.Chisholm, Roderick(1986)。The Myth of Given。Empirical Knowledg。Totowa:Rowman and Littlefield。  new window
 
 
 
 
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