歐洲聯盟執行委員會對英特爾案所作的行政處分存在明顯瑕疵。首先，執委會未能慎思此案中相關市場的實際狀況，所作的市場力量評估顯然有誤。誠如執委會所言，英特爾已取得的智慧財產權，對有意進入相關市場參與競爭的企業確係明顯的智慧財產權壁壘，但礙於下游電腦代工廠與英特爾的競爭對手的市場影響力，英特爾事實上無法毫無顧忌地利用其市場力量。其次，執委會對同等效能競爭者測試法之理論的說明，無法令公眾明瞭其實施此測試法的方式。此高度不明確性對成千上萬於歐洲市場運作的企業，特別是擁有獨占地位的企業，極可能造成寒蟬效應。第三，執委會於英特爾案的行政處分，適用了不具法律拘束力的「關於歐洲共同體條約第82條施行重點之指南」，特別是其中關於同等效能競爭者測試法的規定。執委會將此指南作為法律加以適用，顯有違歐盟法的法律確定性原則。關於執委會所稱英特爾所採取的明顯限制行為，執委會指出，英特爾以提供財務支援的方式，限制下游電腦代工廠按計畫製造與販賣內含（英特爾的競爭對手）AMD產品的電腦，但執委會未能提出充足的證據以支持其結論。此外，執委會指稱，英特爾的行為致使代工廠限制內含AMD產品之電腦的製造與販賣，但執委會亦未能提出充分的證據。

The Intel Decision is significantly flawed. First, the Commission did not take into serious account the dynamics of the relevant markets. The market power evaluation by the Commission was flawed because Intel was not able freely to exercise the market power. Second, the Commission's explanations for the theory of 'as efficient competitor test' do not help the public fully understand how the Commission performed this test. The myth of how the test was used would presumably create chilling effects on numerous companies in various European markets, particularly the dominant firms. Third, the Commission applied Guidance on enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 EC, in particular as efficient competitor test set out in the document, to the Intel case. The Commission applied the test as if the Guidance Paper was legally binding, which violated the principle of legal certainty. As regards the issues of naked restrictions, the Commission failed to present sufficient evidence to support that Intel paid the OEMs to restrict the commercialisation of planned AMD-based products. Also, the Commission failed to prove that the conduct of Intel had a material effect on the decision-making of OEMs in that they restricted the commercialisation of AMD-based computers.