本文旨在研究廠商如何調整其內部組織結構與誘因契約, 以因應市場環境變化。它說明如果中級經理人的主要任務是收集市場資訊時, 市場競爭程度的大小, 如何影響廠商內部的層級結構及員工的契約內容。我們提出兩種可能的市場競爭程度的指標。在第一種指標下, 增加競爭使得廠商進行組織扁平化, 並提供管理者較強的工作誘因。這和近來的實證文獻結果相合。但若以另一種指標衡量競爭時, 則會得到相反的結果。因此, 本文不僅提供實證文獻所得到關於市場競爭與廠商內部結構的關係一個理論釋, 並說明這些實證發現在理論上的真正意涵。

This paper investigates how the firm adjusts its internal structure and alters its incentive contracts in response to the market environment. Specifically, it is concerned with the firm's optimal hierarchical structure and the corresponding incentive contracts for the managers as a function of variables which are related to the degree of market competition, when the middle manager's sole function is information-gathering. Consistent with recent empirical literature, we show that under one measure of market competitiveness, an increase in competitiveness leads the firm to flatten its hierarchy and offer stronger incentives to its agents. However, under another measure, the reverse is true. The paper therefore not only offers a theoretical rationale for some of the recent empirical findings regarding the relation between market competition and the internal structure of firms, but also provides theoretical qualifications for these findings.