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題名:套利行為、政府執法與國際智慧財產權保護政策
書刊名:農業與經濟
作者:吳健瑋 引用關係林億明 引用關係
作者(外文):Wu, Chien-weiLin, Yih-ming
出版日期:2013
卷期:50
頁次:頁99-130
主題關鍵詞:專利研發均衡PatentsInnovationEquilibrium
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:12
本文建立一個南北國並非完全隔離的智財權保護模型,探討套利行為如何影響南北兩國智慧財產權保護政策。分析結果發現:北國將允許部分套利行為的存在,並藉由延長智財權保護時效補償研發者因套利行為而產生的損失,可以改善研發國家的社會福利。此外,全球單一智財權標準會影響套利行為存在,並無法使全球社會福利水準達到極大。
This study focuses on the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs), examining a North/South model in which market segmentation is incomplete. We investigate the way in which the existence of arbitrage affects the incentives of the two countries to set their appropriate duration of patent protection. Our results show that the North has no incentive to completely eliminate arbitrage after patents have expired in the South, despite the fact that enforcement may be costless. The results also reveal that if the demand function for an innovation is linear, then a noncooperative game of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists between the North and the South. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a uniform universal standard for IPR protection will never achieve global Pareto efficiency when markets are not perfectly segmented.
期刊論文
1.Diwan, I.、Rodrik, D.(1991)。Patents, Appropriate Technology and North- South Trade。Journal of International Economics,23,79-90。  new window
2.Gilbert, R.、Shapiro, C.(1990)。Optimal Patent Length and Breadth。RAND Journal of Economics,21,106-112。  new window
3.Grossman, Gene、Lai, Edwin L. C.(2004)。International Protection of Intellectual Property。American Economic Review,94(5),1635-1653。  new window
4.Lai, E.、Qiu, L.(2003)。The North’s Intellectual Property Rights Standard for the South?。Journal of International Economics,59,183-209。  new window
5.Mitra, D.(1999)。Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination。American Economic Review,89(5),1116-1134。  new window
6.Samuelson, P.(2004)。Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections。University of Chicago Law Review,71,223-239。  new window
7.Scotchmer, S.(2004)。The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties。Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations,20,415-437。  new window
8.Spors, K.(20040722)。Canadian Drugs are Getting Cheaper: Online Pharmacies Catering to America Cut Costs by Finding New Suppliers。Wall Street Journal,1。  new window
9.The Economist Group(19960511)。Stolen Melodies。The Economist,64。  new window
10.Weil, E.(20040530)。Grumpy Old Drug Smugglers。New York Times Magazine,42-45。  new window
11.Zhao, M.(2006)。Conducting R&D in Countries with Weal Intellectual Property Rights Protection。Management Science,52,1185-1199。  new window
12.Grossman, Gene M.、Helpman, Elhanan(1994)。Protection for Sale。American Economic Review,84(4),833-850。  new window
13.Deardorff, A.(1992)。Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection。Economica,59,35-51。  new window
圖書
1.Braga, C.(1990)。The Developing Country Case For and Against Intellectual Property Protection。Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Property in Developing Countries: A Survey of the Literature。Washington, DC:World Bank Press。  new window
2.Chin, J.、Grossman, G.(1990)。Intellectual Property Rights and North-South Trade。The Political Economy of International Trade。Cambridge, MA:Basil Blackwell Press。  new window
3.Krugman, P.(1992)。Regionalism versus Multilateralism。New Dimensions in Regional Integration。Cambridge, MA:Cambridge University Press。  new window
4.Maskus, K.(2000)。Intellectual Property Rights in the Global。Economy, Washington, DC:Institute for International Economics Press。  new window
其他
1.WTO(1994)。Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#nAgreement。  new window
 
 
 
 
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