愛津頓認為一個關於指示條件句的語意論必須解釋兩個現象：（一）從「A或C」推論出「如果不是A，則C」是合理的；與（二）我們可以合理地不去相信「A」與不去相信「如果A，則C」。接著，她論證真值函數語意論只能解釋（一）但卻不能解釋（二）；另一方面，史東內克的語意論則是可以解釋（二）但卻不能解釋（一）。此外，她認為即使史東內克的語意論可以透過引進「脈絡集」而能夠解釋（一），但是脈絡概念的引進將會使得一個語句會隨著脈絡的改變而表達不同的命題，而這將使得各執一詞的兩方之間根本沒有爭論，所以有違我們的直覺。因此，她認為指示條件句並不表達命題。本文旨在論證史東內克引進脈絡的概念後，在某個意義下，仍然可以解釋爭論的現象。

Edgington mentioned that there are two prima facie desirable properties of indicative conditionals: (i) minimal certainty that A or C is enough for certainty that if not A, C; (ii) it is not necessarily irrational to disbelieve A yet disbelieve that if A, C. Then, she argued that those claim conditionals do express propositions (or have truth conditions) cannot satisfy both. Moreover, she argued that, by introducing the notion of context set, Stalnaker's semantics may satisfy both, but on his account there will be no disagreement, which is counter-intuitive, when debating. In this paper, I will argue that Stalnaker's semantics can explain disagreement, in a sense, by introducing the notion of context.