In Husserl’s phenomenology, "phenomenon" is defined as the unification of appearing (apparition) and that which appears. The appearing has two meanings: on the one hand, it is the self-appearance of that which appears; on the other, it is my consciousness of something that appears to me, for it is always in my consciousness that something can appear to me. Thus, in Husserl’s phenomenology, the manifestation of that which appears is precisely the apparition through consciousness. Levinas modifies Husserl’s definition of phenomenon. He strictly distinguishes the manifestation of things through itself from that through my consciousness, and only takes the latter as a phenomenon. Levinas regards the face as a manifestation through itself but not as a phenomenon. However, as a self-manifestation, face is a kind of self-givenness; in this sense, it is also a kind of phenomenon. In this way, Levinas has made a breakthrough of Husserl’s concept of phenomenon, and therefore, on the basis of the face, has created the possibility of speaking the absolute other in phenomenology.