在產業經濟學中遊樂園如何訂定門票價格一直是被廣泛探討的議題之一，本文引入近幾年在網路經濟學裡提出的新概念－雙邊市場，分析當遊樂園訂定門票時若考量了雙邊市場（指遊客與進駐園區的廠商）因素後，對其門票價格有何影響。主要結論發現，在獨占的情況下，若遊客端之交叉網路外部性大（小）於廠商端的交叉網路外部性時，遊樂園將提高（降低）其門票價格；考慮進雙邊市場後的園區收益提高。而若存在競爭的情況下，不論哪一方的外部性較大，遊樂園皆會降低其門票價格；雖然有廠商面的收入，但在考慮進雙邊市場後的園區收益因更競爭而下降。

Setting amusement park admission fees is a major issue within organizations in this industry. This paper introduces a new concept, known as a two-sided market, into the pricing behavior of amusement parks. In a two-sided market, two or more groups of agents such as buyers/consumers and sellers/firms interact via some sort of medium that is called the ＂platform＂ of interaction. Our main findings are as follows: 1. a monopolistic amusement park will increase (decrease) the admission fee if the consumers have a larger (smaller) cross-side network externality and will enable the park to enjoy higher revenues when compared to amusement parks without externality; and; 2. in the case of duopolistic amusement parks, no matter which agent has a larger cross-side network externality, amusement parks will always decrease admission fees and receive lower revenues because of the increased competition in a two-sided market when compared to amusement parks without any externality.