中國證監會自 2002年開始要求上市公司引入薪酬委員會制度。那麼，這一制度的實施效果是否帶來了上市公司高管薪酬的優化？本文對薪酬委員會的建立及其獨立性與高管薪酬契約之間的關係進行了分析。我們的研究發現，薪酬委員會的建立及其獨立性的提升都顯著提高了上市公司高管薪酬水準和薪酬-業績敏感度。進一步的分組檢驗表明，薪酬委員會的設立及其獨立性對於薪酬水準和薪酬-業績敏感度的提升主要存在於國有企業，支持了“昀優契約論”的觀點。與此同時，根據管理層權力大小劃分後，在管理層權力較高的企業，薪酬委員會的設立在提高高管薪酬的同時不能相應的提高薪酬-業績敏感度，其獨立性也無法顯著影響薪酬契約的制定，這些結果支持了“管理層權力論”的論點。我們的研究結果表明薪酬委員會制度在特定的情況下優化了上市公司的內部治理結構，增加上市公司高管薪酬契約的有效性。

Since 2002, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has required companies listed in China to set up compensation committees. In response to this requirement, this paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation and the establishment and independence of such committees. Our results show that the existence of compensation committees (and their greater independence) can improve both the level of pay and the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation in SOEs, supporting the optimal contracting argument. In contrast, when managerial power is stronger than that of the compensation committee, pay increases but not the pay-performance sensitivity, with the committee’s independence having no significant impact on compensation contracts. These findings are in line with the managerial power argument. Our results indicate that the CSRC’s requirement that listed companies form independent compensation committees is effective under certain conditions.