本文旨在探討為何有些公司自願停止在盈餘宣告中提供擬制性盈餘資訊，並研究此一選擇如何影響這些公司後續的財務報導政策。我們以人工收集資料的方式收集2002-2010 年間樣本公司在盈餘宣告中所揭露的擬制性盈餘資訊。我們發現有近五分之一的樣本公司在我們的樣本期間(2002-2010)內，停止了在盈餘宣告中提供擬制性盈餘資訊。由於美國證管會在2001 年12 月起加強對擬制性盈餘揭露的監管，並且實施Regulation G 要求公司提高擬制性盈餘揭露的透明度，我們發現在美國證管會加強對擬制性盈餘揭露的監管之前，公司若提供擬制性盈餘資訊試圖誤導投資人或公司只從提供擬制性盈餘資訊獲得有限的好處，則這些公司較可能在我們的樣本期間停止在盈餘宣告中提供擬制性盈餘資訊，顯示在美國證管會加強對擬制性盈餘揭露的監管後，提供擬制性盈餘資訊的成本提高而獲得的好處減少。此外，若公司曾收到美國證管會質疑該公司擬制性盈餘的意見函，則這樣的公司也比較可能停止在盈餘宣告中提供擬制性盈餘資訊。本文也發現若公司比較可能投機性的提供擬制性盈餘，則在停止提供擬制性盈餘資訊後，公司會使用盈餘管理取代提供擬制性盈餘資訊，但投資人察覺到這些公司可能在停止提供擬制性盈餘資訊後增加盈餘操縱使盈餘品質變差，因此在停止提供擬制性盈餘資訊後投資人給予這些公司的未預期盈餘較低的評價。

This paper investigates why firms voluntarily stop providing non-GAAP earnings disclosure in their earnings releases (hereafter, stopped firms) and whether this decision affects their subsequent financial reporting policies. Using hand-collected non-GAAP earnings disclosure data between 2002 and 2010, we observe that about one-fifth of our sample firms stopped non-GAAP earnings reporting altogether during our sample period. Consistent with the idea that the SEC’s increased scrutiny and the transparency of non-GAAP disclosure required by Regulation G increase the costs and decrease the benefits of non-GAAP reporting, we find that firms issuing non-GAAP disclosure to mislead investors and firms deriving fewer benefits from non-GAAP reporting are more likely to relinquish non-GAAP disclosure. Moreover, firms receiving the SEC’s comment letters questioning their use of non-GAAP financial measures in SEC filings are more inclined to stop providing non-GAAP disclosure in earnings releases. Furthermore, we find that stopped firms that are more likely to be opportunistic non-GAAP reporters tend to substitute accrual management for non-GAAP disclosure after they stop non-GAAP reporting. Interestingly, investors react less strongly to unexpected earnings of these firms after they stopped disclosing non-GAAP information, consistent with the market perceiving earnings news of opportunistic reporting firms as less informative after their stop decision.