法人與自然人投保者與保險標的之間的「隱藏訊息差異」，如何影響不對稱訊息的情況，過去文獻仍未探究。我們採用車體保險的個人資料，妥善控制投保者的「汽車重置成本」與「增購各種任意汽車保險或車體險附加險種類多寡」，來衡量財富效果與風險趨避程度，實證發現: 財富效果與風險趨避程度所構成的「隱藏訊息差異」具有內生性，的確會差異化地影響法人與自然人車體保險市場不對稱訊息的情況，使得法人在汽車價格區間大於70萬的各子樣本，不對稱訊息普遍較為顯著，這些現象除了顯示法人投保者受到汽車所有權的影響較為顯著，保險公司對於掌握法人優勢訊息的能力仍然有待提升。

There exists little mention about how the company insured' and individual insured' heterogeneity of hidden information derived from insurable interest between insured and his/her personal properties leads to the problem of asymmetric information (adverse selection). Applying Taiwan's car damage insurance individual data, we elaborate auto replacement cost and the number of demanding for additional coverage to be both the level of agents' wealth and risk averse to test if the heterogeneity of hidden information significantly and variously causes the asymmetric information in the car insurance market. The empirical results show that such heterogeneity indeed exist a significant context to cause asymmetric information in Taiwan's car insurance market. Under the specific setting of auto replacement cost approximately equal to or more than NT 700,000, company insured present a more significant context of asymmetric information than individual insured. This condition appears that company insured are more heavily influenced by car ownerships than individual insured, and practically indicates that to some extent insurers much likely suffer the inefficiency of dealing with the private information of company insured.