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來源文獻資料
摘要
外文摘要
引文資料
題名:
關稅遊說競爭與遊說誘因
書刊名:
農業與經濟
作者:
許淑媖
/
林燕淑
作者(外文):
Hsu, Su-ying
/
Lin, Yan-shu
出版日期:
2017
卷期:
59
頁次:
頁153-186
主題關鍵詞:
雙佔
;
本國遊說
;
外國遊說
;
最適關稅
;
Duopoly
;
Lobbying incentives
;
Domestic lobbying
;
Foreign lobbying
;
Tariff rate
原始連結:
連回原系統網址
相關次數:
被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
排除自我引用:0
共同引用:
11
點閱:6
本文設立一個雙佔模型來討論廠商的均衡遊說行為、有遊說活動下之最適關稅及開放廠商進行遊說活動對利潤及社會的影響。本文得到的結論為當本國的生產者剩餘在政府的目標函數之權重愈大時,本國廠商會有愈強的誘因進行遊說;此外,當外國廠商的遊說支出移轉至政府的目標函數比例愈大時,外國廠商跨國遊說的誘因會增強。值得強調的是,若外國廠商從事跨國遊說,遊說支出有愈高比例移轉到政府的目標函數時,不但外國廠商的利潤會提高,執政者追求的目標也會提昇。此一結論與一般人認為開放跨國遊說不利於政府所追求的目標之認知不盡相同。
以文找文
This paper sets up a duopolistic model to discuss the lobbying incentives, the optimal tariff under lobbying activities, and the impact of opening up international lobbying on firms' profits and on society. The findings show that the domestic firm has a stronger incentive to conduct lobbying when the government has a higher affinity toward producer surplus in its objective function. In addition, the incentives for the foreign firm to conduct cross-border lobbying are enhanced when the proportion of foreign firm' lobbying expenditure that shifts to the government's objective function is larger. Given the foreign firm's cross-border lobbying, the results emphasize that not only does the foreign firm's profit increase, but also the goal pursued by the domestic government rises when the proportion of foreign lobbying expenditure that shifts to the domestic government is higher. This conclusion is in stark difference to the common conception that opening up international lobbying is not conducive to the government's goal.
以文找文
期刊論文
1.
Grossman, Gene M.、Helpman, Elhanan(1995)。Trade Wars and Trade Talks。Journal of Political Economy,103(4),675-708。
2.
Rama, Martín、Tabellini, Guido(1998)。Lobbying by Capital and Labor Over Trade and Labor Market Policies。European Economic Review,42(7),1295-1316。
3.
Austen-Smith, D.(1994)。Strategic Transmission of Costly Information。Econometrica,62,955-963。
4.
賴育邦(20051200)。利益團體、工資談判與環境政策。農業與經濟,35,87-118。
延伸查詢
5.
Hillman, A. L.、Ursprung, H.(1988)。Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy。American Economic Review,78,729-745。
6.
Bhagwati, J.(1982)。Directly-Unproductive, Profit-Seeking Activities。Journed of Political Economy,90,988-1002。
7.
Gawande, K.、Bandyopadhyay, U.(2000)。Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection。Review of Economics and Statistics,82,139-152。
8.
Mayer, Wolfgang(1984)。Endogenous Tariff Formation。American Economic Review,74(5),970-985。
9.
Bernheim, B. D.、Whinston, M. D.(1986)。Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation and Economic Influence。Quarterly Journal of Economics,101(1),1-31。
10.
王智賢、楊敦雅(2008)。仿冒查緝與政治獻金。經濟研究,44,107-138。
延伸查詢
11.
呂斯文(2008)。進口農產品稅率調整機制之簡介。農政與農情,188,31-36。
延伸查詢
12.
連弘宜(2016)。俄羅斯利益團體的形成與演進。政治科學論叢,68,77-102。
延伸查詢
13.
張子介(2015)。台灣遊說集團對美國國會的遊說--以台北經濟文化代表處和台灣人公共事務協會為例。美國研究,3,97-113。
延伸查詢
14.
Austen-Smith, D.、Wright, J. R.(1992)。Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote。Social Choice and Welfare,9,229-257。
15.
Cai, D.、Li, J.(2014)。Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms。Southern Economic Journal,81,489-505。
16.
Feenstra, R.、Lewis, T.(1991)。Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure。Quarterly Journal of Economics,106(4),1287-1307。
17.
Dixit, A.、Grossman, G.、Helpman, E.(1997)。Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making。Journal of Political Economy,105,752-769。
18.
d'Aspremont, C.、Ferreira, R. D. S.(2010)。Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game。Games and Economic Behavior,70,21-33。
19.
Gawande, K.、Krishna, P.、Robbins, M.(2006)。Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy。Review of Economics and Statistics,88,563-571。
20.
Kagitani, K.(2009)。Political Economy of Strategic Export Policy in a Differentiated Duopoly。Japanese Economic Review,60,236-252。
21.
Hillman, A. L.、Ursprung, H.(1993)。Multinational Firms, Political Competition, and International Trade Policy。International Economic Review,34,347-363。
22.
Mohtadi, H.、Roe, T.(1998)。Growth, Lobbying and Public Goods。European Journal of Political Economy,14,453-473。
23.
Mitra, D.、Thomakos, D.、Ulubasoglu, M.(2006)。Can We Obtain Realistic Parameter Estimates for the 'Protection for Sale' Model?。Canadian Journal of Economics,39,187-210。
24.
Qiu, L.(2004)。Lobbying, Multisector Trade, and Sustainability of Free-Trade Agreements。Canadian Journal of Economics,37,1061-1083。
25.
Stoyanov, A.(2014)。Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying。Review of International Economics,22,561-577。
26.
Stoyanov, A.(2009)。Trade Policy of a Free Trade Agreement in the Presence of Foreign Lobbying。Journal of International Economics,77,37-49。
27.
Qiu, L.(2008)。Endogenous Lobbying Positions。Review of International Economics,16,641-653。
28.
林奇蓉(20040900)。政治遊說與策略性貿易政策。經濟論文叢刊,32(3),347-367。
延伸查詢
29.
Spencer, Barbara J.、Brander, James A.(1984)。Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels。Journal of International Economics,16(3/4),227-242。
30.
Brander, James A.、Spencer, Barbara J.(1985)。Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry。Journal of International Economics,18(1/2),83-100。
31.
Grossman, Gene M.、Helpman, Elhanan(1994)。Protection for Sale。American Economic Review,84(4),833-850。
32.
Maggi, Giovanni、Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou(1999)。Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation。The American Economic Review,89(5),1135-1155。
33.
Moore, M. O.、Suranovic, S. M.(1993)。Lobbying and Cournot-Nash Competition: Implications for Strategic Trade Policy。Journal of International Economics,35,367-376。
34.
Michaelis, P.(1994)。Regulate US, Please! On Strategic Lobbying in Cournot-Nash Oligopoly。Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,150,693-709。
圖書
1.
Corden, W. Max(1971)。The Theory of Protection。Oxford:Clarendon Press。
2.
Hillman, A. L.(1989)。The Political Economy of Protection。Harwood Academic Publishers。
3.
Mueller, Dennis C.(2003)。Public Choice。Cambridge University Press。
4.
Feenstra, R. C.(2004)。Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence。New Jersey:Princeton University Press。
5.
Magee, S. P.、Brock, W. A.、Young, L.(1989)。Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。
6.
Bandyopadhyay, S.、Lahiri, S.(2016)。Possible Unintended Effects of Restrictions on Foreign Lobbying in a Customs Union。
7.
Persson, T.、Tabellini, G.(2002)。Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy。The MIT Press。
8.
Olson, Mancur Jr.(1965)。The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups。Harvard University Press。
其他
1.
Adachi, T.(2017)。Vertical Integration and Common Agency: An Empirical Analysis of the US Carbonated Soft Drink Industry。
圖書論文
1.
Krueger, A.(2001)。The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society。Landmark Papers in Economics, Politics and Law。Edward Elgar Press。
2.
Rodrik, D.(1995)。Political Economy of Trade Policy。Handbook of International Economics。Oxford:North-Holland Press。
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