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題名:關稅遊說競爭與遊說誘因
書刊名:農業與經濟
作者:許淑媖林燕淑 引用關係
作者(外文):Hsu, Su-yingLin, Yan-shu
出版日期:2017
卷期:59
頁次:頁153-186
主題關鍵詞:雙佔本國遊說外國遊說最適關稅DuopolyLobbying incentivesDomestic lobbyingForeign lobbyingTariff rate
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
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  • 共同引用共同引用:11
  • 點閱點閱:6
本文設立一個雙佔模型來討論廠商的均衡遊說行為、有遊說活動下之最適關稅及開放廠商進行遊說活動對利潤及社會的影響。本文得到的結論為當本國的生產者剩餘在政府的目標函數之權重愈大時,本國廠商會有愈強的誘因進行遊說;此外,當外國廠商的遊說支出移轉至政府的目標函數比例愈大時,外國廠商跨國遊說的誘因會增強。值得強調的是,若外國廠商從事跨國遊說,遊說支出有愈高比例移轉到政府的目標函數時,不但外國廠商的利潤會提高,執政者追求的目標也會提昇。此一結論與一般人認為開放跨國遊說不利於政府所追求的目標之認知不盡相同。
This paper sets up a duopolistic model to discuss the lobbying incentives, the optimal tariff under lobbying activities, and the impact of opening up international lobbying on firms' profits and on society. The findings show that the domestic firm has a stronger incentive to conduct lobbying when the government has a higher affinity toward producer surplus in its objective function. In addition, the incentives for the foreign firm to conduct cross-border lobbying are enhanced when the proportion of foreign firm' lobbying expenditure that shifts to the government's objective function is larger. Given the foreign firm's cross-border lobbying, the results emphasize that not only does the foreign firm's profit increase, but also the goal pursued by the domestic government rises when the proportion of foreign lobbying expenditure that shifts to the domestic government is higher. This conclusion is in stark difference to the common conception that opening up international lobbying is not conducive to the government's goal.
期刊論文
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8.Mayer, Wolfgang(1984)。Endogenous Tariff Formation。American Economic Review,74(5),970-985。  new window
9.Bernheim, B. D.、Whinston, M. D.(1986)。Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation and Economic Influence。Quarterly Journal of Economics,101(1),1-31。  new window
10.王智賢、楊敦雅(2008)。仿冒查緝與政治獻金。經濟研究,44,107-138。new window  延伸查詢new window
11.呂斯文(2008)。進口農產品稅率調整機制之簡介。農政與農情,188,31-36。  延伸查詢new window
12.連弘宜(2016)。俄羅斯利益團體的形成與演進。政治科學論叢,68,77-102。new window  延伸查詢new window
13.張子介(2015)。台灣遊說集團對美國國會的遊說--以台北經濟文化代表處和台灣人公共事務協會為例。美國研究,3,97-113。  延伸查詢new window
14.Austen-Smith, D.、Wright, J. R.(1992)。Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator's Vote。Social Choice and Welfare,9,229-257。  new window
15.Cai, D.、Li, J.(2014)。Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms。Southern Economic Journal,81,489-505。  new window
16.Feenstra, R.、Lewis, T.(1991)。Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure。Quarterly Journal of Economics,106(4),1287-1307。  new window
17.Dixit, A.、Grossman, G.、Helpman, E.(1997)。Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making。Journal of Political Economy,105,752-769。  new window
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19.Gawande, K.、Krishna, P.、Robbins, M.(2006)。Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy。Review of Economics and Statistics,88,563-571。  new window
20.Kagitani, K.(2009)。Political Economy of Strategic Export Policy in a Differentiated Duopoly。Japanese Economic Review,60,236-252。  new window
21.Hillman, A. L.、Ursprung, H.(1993)。Multinational Firms, Political Competition, and International Trade Policy。International Economic Review,34,347-363。  new window
22.Mohtadi, H.、Roe, T.(1998)。Growth, Lobbying and Public Goods。European Journal of Political Economy,14,453-473。  new window
23.Mitra, D.、Thomakos, D.、Ulubasoglu, M.(2006)。Can We Obtain Realistic Parameter Estimates for the 'Protection for Sale' Model?。Canadian Journal of Economics,39,187-210。  new window
24.Qiu, L.(2004)。Lobbying, Multisector Trade, and Sustainability of Free-Trade Agreements。Canadian Journal of Economics,37,1061-1083。  new window
25.Stoyanov, A.(2014)。Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying。Review of International Economics,22,561-577。  new window
26.Stoyanov, A.(2009)。Trade Policy of a Free Trade Agreement in the Presence of Foreign Lobbying。Journal of International Economics,77,37-49。  new window
27.Qiu, L.(2008)。Endogenous Lobbying Positions。Review of International Economics,16,641-653。  new window
28.林奇蓉(20040900)。政治遊說與策略性貿易政策。經濟論文叢刊,32(3),347-367。new window  延伸查詢new window
29.Spencer, Barbara J.、Brander, James A.(1984)。Trade Warfare: Tariffs and Cartels。Journal of International Economics,16(3/4),227-242。  new window
30.Brander, James A.、Spencer, Barbara J.(1985)。Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry。Journal of International Economics,18(1/2),83-100。  new window
31.Grossman, Gene M.、Helpman, Elhanan(1994)。Protection for Sale。American Economic Review,84(4),833-850。  new window
32.Maggi, Giovanni、Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou(1999)。Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation。The American Economic Review,89(5),1135-1155。  new window
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圖書
1.Corden, W. Max(1971)。The Theory of Protection。Oxford:Clarendon Press。  new window
2.Hillman, A. L.(1989)。The Political Economy of Protection。Harwood Academic Publishers。  new window
3.Mueller, Dennis C.(2003)。Public Choice。Cambridge University Press。  new window
4.Feenstra, R. C.(2004)。Advanced International Trade: Theory and Evidence。New Jersey:Princeton University Press。  new window
5.Magee, S. P.、Brock, W. A.、Young, L.(1989)。Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory: Political Economy in General Equilibrium。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。  new window
6.Bandyopadhyay, S.、Lahiri, S.(2016)。Possible Unintended Effects of Restrictions on Foreign Lobbying in a Customs Union。  new window
7.Persson, T.、Tabellini, G.(2002)。Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy。The MIT Press。  new window
8.Olson, Mancur Jr.(1965)。The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups。Harvard University Press。  new window
其他
1.Adachi, T.(2017)。Vertical Integration and Common Agency: An Empirical Analysis of the US Carbonated Soft Drink Industry。  new window
圖書論文
1.Krueger, A.(2001)。The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society。Landmark Papers in Economics, Politics and Law。Edward Elgar Press。  new window
2.Rodrik, D.(1995)。Political Economy of Trade Policy。Handbook of International Economics。Oxford:North-Holland Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
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