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題名:董事會特性與IPO異常現象
書刊名:東吳經濟商學學報
作者:江淑貞
作者(外文):Chiang, Sue-jane
出版日期:2018
卷期:97
頁次:頁35-62
主題關鍵詞:忙碌董事會董事特性IPO異常現象Busy boardBoard characteristicsIPO anomalies
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 共同引用共同引用:52
  • 點閱點閱:4
本文以2002-2015年在台灣股市辦理IPO的803家公司為分析對象,討論忙碌董事會、董事特性對IPO長短期績效之影響。根據本文的實證結果顯示:忙碌董事會的存在,有助於降低初始報酬,並對長期績效有邊際顯著的正向影響。另外,在上市、上櫃的分群的分析結果則顯示:忙碌董事會、董事特性對短期績效的影響,在上市公司與上櫃公司並不相同。對上市公司而言,忙碌董事會的存在不但無法降低短期初始報酬,甚至對長期績效具顯著負向影響。反觀在上櫃公司部分,忙碌董事會的存在不但顯著降低短期初始報酬,也對長期績效有著顯著的正向影響。
We explore how busy board and board characteristics affect IPO anomalies which are short-term initial return and long-term performance, using the sample of 803 IPOs in Taiwan in the period of 2002-2015. Our empirical results indicate that busy board play different role between OTC and TSE. Busy board can reduce initial return and enhance long-term performance for OTC IPO firms, while busy board has no effect on initial return and results in long-term underperformance for TSE IPO firms.
期刊論文
1.Baker, M.、Gompers, P. A.(2003)。The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering。The Journal of Law and Economics,46(2),569-598。  new window
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3.王祝三、莊雅雪、郭勁甫(20090900)。公司治理、投資與公司價值之關聯性。東吳經濟商學學報,66,69-114。new window  延伸查詢new window
4.Gilson, S. C.(1990)。Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default。Journal of Financial Economics,27,355-387。  new window
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11.Field, Laura、Lowry, Michelle、Mkrtchyan, Anahit(2013)。Are busy boards detrimental?。Journal of Financial Economics,109(1),63-82。  new window
12.Gilson, S. C.(1989)。Management turnover and financial distress。Journal of Financial Economics,25(2),241-262。  new window
13.Bugeja, M.、Rosa, R. D. S.、Lee, A.(2009)。The impact of director reputation and performance on the turnover and board seats of target firm directors。Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,36,185-209。  new window
14.Coles, J.、Hoi, C.(2003)。New evidence on the market for directors: board membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310。Journal of Finance,58,197-230。  new window
15.Liu, X.、Ritter, J. R.(2010)。Economic consequences of IPO spinning。Review of Financial Studies,23(5),2024-2059。  new window
16.Roosenboom, P.(2005)。Bargaining on board structure at the initial public offering。Journal of Management Governance,9,171-198。  new window
17.Yeh, Yin-Hua、Shu, Pei-Gi、Guo, Re-Ji(2008)。Ownership structure and IPO valuation--evidence from Taiwan。Financial Management,37(1),141-161。  new window
18.Fama, Eugene F.、Jensen, Michael C.(1983)。Separation of ownership and control。The Journal of Law & Economics,26(2),301-325。  new window
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22.Ferris, Stephen P.、Jagannathan, Murali、Pritchard, Adam C.(2003)。Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments。The Journal of Finance,58(3),1087-1111。  new window
會議論文
1.Arranz-Aperte, L.、Berglund, T.(2008)。Are busy directors good or bad for firm performance?。FMA European Conference,(會議日期: 4 June 2008)。Prague。  new window
學位論文
1.林書平(2007)。忙碌董事會與忙碌董事對經營績效之影響(碩士論文)。中國文化大學。  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.Council of Institutional Investors(1998)。Core policies, positions and explanatory notes。Washington, DC。  new window
2.Institutional Shareholder Services(2009)。US governance policy。  new window
3.National Association of Corporate Directors(1996)。Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on director professionalism。  new window
 
 
 
 
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