:::

詳目顯示

回上一頁
題名:事實性狀態、情感與知識
書刊名:東吳哲學學報
作者:趙曉傲
作者(外文):Chio, Hio-ngou
出版日期:2021
卷期:44
頁次:頁59-93
主題關鍵詞:情感知識歸屬事實性狀態不可錯論可錯論EmotionsKnowledge attributionFactive stateInfallibilismFallibilism
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
相關次數:
  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(0) 博士論文(0) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:0
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:6
期刊論文
1.Benton, M.(2021)。Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism。Synthese,198,1673-1689。  new window
2.Dietz, C. H.(2018)。Reasons and Factive Emotions。Philosophical Studies,175,1681-1691。  new window
3.Dodd, D.(2010)。Confusion about Concessive Knowledge Attributions。Synthese,172,381-396。  new window
4.Dougherty, T.、Rysiew, P.(2009)。Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions。Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,78(1),123-132。  new window
5.Dutant, J.(2016)。How to Be an Infallibilist。Philosophical Issues,26,148-171。  new window
6.Gordon, R. M.(1969)。Emotions and Knowledge。Journal of Philosophy,66,408-413。  new window
7.Neill, A.(1991)。Fear, Fiction and Make-Believe。Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,49(1),47-56。  new window
8.Reed, B.(2013)。Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency。Philosophical Issues,23,40-69。  new window
9.Rysiew, P.(2001)。The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions。NOÛS,35(4),477-514。  new window
10.Stanley, J.(2005)。Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions。Analysis,65(2),126-131。  new window
11.Walton, K. L.(1978)。Fearing Fictions。The Journal of Philosophy,75(1),5-27。  new window
圖書
1.Gordon, Robert M.(1987)。The structure of emotions: investigations in cognitive philosophy。Cambridge:Cambridge University Press。  new window
2.Williamson, T.(2000)。Knowledge and its Limits。Oxford:Oxford University Press。  new window
3.Fantl, Jeremy、McGrath, Matthew(2009)。Knowledge in an Uncertain World。Oxford:Oxford University Press。  new window
4.Barrett, Lisa Feldman(2017)。How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the Brain。Houghton Mifflin Harcourt。  new window
5.Brown, J.(2018)。Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge。Oxford University Press。  new window
6.Kiesewetter, B.(2017)。The Normativity of Rationality。Oxford University Press。  new window
7.Lord, E.(2018)。The Importance of Being Rational。Oxford University Press。  new window
8.Tappolet, C.(2016)。Emotions, Values, and Agency。Oxford University Press。  new window
9.Unger, P.(1975)。Ignorance: A Defense of Skepticism。Clarendon Press。  new window
圖書論文
1.Kaplan, D.(2012)。An Idea of Donnellan。Having In Mind: The Philosophy of Keith Donnellan。Oxford University Press。  new window
2.Scarantino, A.(2014)。The Motivational Theory of Emotions。Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics。Oxford University Press。  new window
 
 
 
 
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top