《成唯識寶生論》是護法對世親《唯識二十論》之重要注疏，具有唯識思想研究之價值。尤為特別的是，護法使用因明來詮釋並論證《二十論》與唯識思想，就此而言，《寶生論》的研究一方面可以幫助我們重新解讀《二十論》，特別是從因明論證的角度來看；另一方面也得以研究護法如何理解、使用因明，亦即具有因明研究之價值。本文主要參照護法《寶生論》的詮釋，解讀《二十論》中最主要的因明立、破。論主開頭成立了自宗之後，後續自然地論敵還有很多可能的質疑或回應，在辯論過程中，護法繼續運用因明指出論敵在宗、因、喻上所犯之過失，本文對此整理了一些《寶生論》中的案例，由各個案例來解讀、分析護法對因明之使用。立基於文本的解讀與哲學分析，本文最後討論如何從護法的觀點來看待《二十論》，並對比Birgit Kellner與John Taber之詮釋。此外，也嘗試分析因明論證的利弊得失。筆者認為護法從因明立自破他的解讀呼應了，世親在《二十論》最後所說的：「我已隨自能，略成唯識義」，亦即，從因明成立了一切唯識。本文希望有助於彌補國際學界現有佛教思想史研究的某些不足之處，並提供《二十論》的另一種解讀可能。

Cheng weishi baosheng lun 成唯識寶生論, extant only in Chinese, is Dharmapāla's (530-561 C.E.) commentary on Vasubandhu's (4th to 5th century C.E.) classic Viṃśikā and its Vṛtti. In his commentary, Dharmapāla explicitly uses Buddhist logic (hetuvidyā) to interpret and to argue for the doctrine of Consciousness-only and against his opponents. However, unlike Viṃśikā, which is very popular, this work has been not well explored and even neglected. The reasons might be that there is no Sanskrit or Tibetan version, and many passages in the Chinese translation by Yijing 義淨 are difficult to be understood. Even though this text is obscure and sometimes ambiguous, it is still worthy of our effort not only because of its complicated argumentation but also because of Dharmapāla's significance in the history of Buddhist thought, especially in East Asia. This paper focuses on Dharmapāla's application of Buddhist logic in his Cheng weishi baosheng lun. Dharmapāla's commentary, very different from Vinītadeva's, specifically uses Buddhist logic (three-membered Indian syllogism) to interpret Vasubandhu's arguments, and furthermore he summarizes the points with that same tool. After establishing the thesis, by pointing out that his opponents have fallacious means of refutation (dūṣaṇābhāsa) or fallacious means of proof (sādhanābhāsa), which means that their statements of proof are defective in respect of the thesis (pakṣa), the reason (hetu), or the example (dṛṣṭānta), Dharmapāla formulates his effective rebuttal to the counterarguments. Case by case, this paper explores Dharmapāla's style of argumentation in his own text. And in the end, with respect to hetuvidyā, a reading of Viṃśikā in Dharmapāla's eyes, contrary to Birgit Kellner and Johan Taber's (2014), is tentatively addressed. It is hoped that this paper will contribute to the study of Dharmapāla and show the value of his works.