Under the American rule, a litigant is responsible for his lawyer's fee. Under the British indemnity rule, the losing party will cover the lawyer's fee at both sides. This paper attempts to evaluate these two rules from the points of view of efficiency and fairness. Our efficiency evaluation supports Hause's (1989) hypothesis that the legal cost is higher under the British rule. But we offer a counterexample to Hause's conjecture that the settlement rate is consequently higher under the British rule. Relatively speaking, we consider the British rule a fair rule. Because under the American rule, if a litigant has his case right but has difficulty to argue, he will offer less argument than his opponent to save his litigation expense. His prevailing probability is consequently lower than the opponent's. The British rule encourages a litigant of this kind to fight, and a litigant inarticulate in his argument has a higher chance to prevail under the Britishrule. The analysis brings to light the utilitarianness and in appropriateness of the traditional approach which takes the litigation expense as an efficiency measure. Such measurement ignores the possibility of a better verdict brought by a higher litigation spending under the British rule.