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題名:經理人員盈餘預測與盈餘操縱之關聯性研究
書刊名:管理與系統
作者:林嬋娟 引用關係官心怡
作者(外文):Lin, Chan-janeKuan, Hsin-yi
出版日期:1996
卷期:3:1
頁次:頁27-41
主題關鍵詞:經理人員盈餘預測盈餘操縱應計項目Management earnings forecastsEarnings manipulationAccrual items
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(6) 博士論文(1) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:6
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:83
     本研究旨在探討經理人員盈餘預測之發佈是否成為其操縱盈餘的誘因 之一。本研究推測,公司經理人員預估當期盈餘可能低於預測盈餘時,為避免造 成股價下跌或遭不滿的投資人控訴,可能採用各種操縱盈餘的方法,使盈餘增 加,以達所預測之目標。本研究以民國80年至81年有經理人員盈餘預測之上市公 司為樣本,將樣本分為兩組:操縱組與對照組。前者係指未操縱前盈餘較預測值 為低的公司,後者則為未操縱前盈餘已達預測盈餘之公司。然後探討操縱組之公 司相對於對照組而言,在裁決性應計項目『出售資產損益以及營業外損益等三種 可能的操縱工具上,是否有顯著不同。本研究實證結果顯示,操縱組公司之經理 人員會利用裁決性應計項目操縱盈餘使其增加,以達預測值,其中經由提高裁決 性應收帳款與裁決性存貨以增加盈餘的情形最為明顯。此外,操縱組公司之經理 人員亦曾透過出售較多投資,認列較多異常營業外利益,使盈餘增加。故本研究 之實證結果支持經理人員可能利用盈餘操縱,使盈餘增加以達預測盈餘之假說。
     The purpose of this study is to examine whether or not managers manipulate earnings after management earnings forecast is issued. Managers may fear the possibility of legal action by disgruntled investors and adverse security price effects, if actual earnings fall short of the forecasts. Therefore, they have an incentive to avoid a shortfall, and may take measures to more reported earningstoward the forecast. The sample in this study is divided into two groups: manipulation group and control group. Manipulation group contains firms whose earnings before manipulation are below forecast num beers, while controe group contains firms whose earnings before manipulation are equal or greater than forecast numbers. Possible manipulation tools include the discretion of accruals, the disposal of assets and the use of non-operating items. This study uses regression model, simple average model and random walk model to estimate the components of accruals - expected accounts receivable, expected inventory and expected accounts payable without manipulation. With respect to income from disposal of assets and non-operating items, the industry average is regarded as the expected amount before manipulation. The degree of manipulation is then estimated by taking the differences between actual and expected numbers. Using firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange between 1991 and 1992 as sample, the empirical results support the hypothesis that firms with earnings before manipulation below the forecasts have used accruals, disposition of assets and non-operating transactions to inflate earnings. In particular, it is found that "earnings-manipulation" firms tend to employ accounts receivable, inventory and income from non-operating items as income increasing manipulation tools.
期刊論文
1.Bruns, W. J. Jr.、Merchant, K. A.(1990)。The dangerous morality of managing earnings。Management Accounting,72(2),22-25。  new window
2.Hassell, J. M.、Jennings, R. H.(1986)。Relative forecast accuracy and the timing of earnings forecast announcements。The Accounting Review,61(1),56-76。  new window
3.Penman, S. H.(1980)。An empirical investigation of the voluntary disclosure of corporate earnings forecasts。Journal of Accounting research,18(1),132-160。  new window
4.Han, J.、Wild, J.(1991)。Stock Price Behavior Associated with Managers' Earnings and Revenue Forecasts。Journal of Accounting Research,29(1),79-95。  new window
5.Zmijewski, M. E.、Hagerman, R. L.(1981)。An Income Strategy Approach to the Positive Theory of Accounting Standard Setting Choice。Journal of Accounting and Economics,3(2),129-149。  new window
6.Hepworth, S. R.(1953)。Smoothing Periodic Income。The Accounting Review,28(1),32-39。  new window
7.Bartov, Eli F.(1993)。The Timing of Asset Sales and Earnings Manipulation。The Accounting Review,68(4),840-855。  new window
8.Baginski, S. P.(1987)。Intraindustry information transfers associated with management forecasts of earnings。Journal of Accounting Research,25(2),196-216。  new window
9.Jones, J. J.(1991)。Earning Management During Import Relief Investigations。Journal of Accounting Research,29(2),193-228。  new window
10.Bartley, J. W.、Cameron, A. B.(1991)。Long-Run Earnings Forecasts by Managers and Financial Analysts。Journal of Business Finance and Accounting,18(1),21-41。  new window
11.Friedlan, J. M.(1994)。Accounting Choice by Issuers of Initial Public Offering。Contemporary Accounting Research,11(1),1-31。  new window
12.McNichols, M.(1989)。Evidence of Informational Asymmetries from Management Earnings Forecasts and Stock Return。The Accounting Review,64(1),1-27。  new window
13.Ruland, W.(1978)。The Accuracy of Foreccasts by Management and by Financial Analysts。The Accounting Review,53(2),439-447。  new window
14.Moses, O. D.(1987)。Income Smoothing and Incentives: Empirical Tests Using Accounting Changes。Accounting Review,62(2),358-377。  new window
15.Aharony, Joseph、Lin, Chan Jane、Loeb, Martin P.(1993)。Initial Public Offerings, Accounting Choices, and Earnings Management。Contemporary Accounting Research,10(1),61-81。  new window
16.Patell, James M.(1976)。Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per Share and Stock Price Behavior: Empirical Test。Journal of Accounting Research,14(2),246-276。  new window
17.Healy, Paul M.(1985)。The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions。Journal of Accounting and Economics,7(1-3),85-107。  new window
18.DeAngelo, Linda E.(1986)。Accounting numbers as market valuation substitutes: A study of management buyouts of public stockholders。The Accounting Review,61(3),400-420。  new window
研究報告
1.Bannister, J. W.、Newman, H. A.(1992)。Management forecasts as targets for earnings management。Chicago:University of Illinois。  new window
學位論文
1.管夢欣(1993)。長期性資產出售交易與盈餘操縱行為之關聯性實證研究(碩士論文)。國立臺灣大學。  延伸查詢new window
2.李國豐(1991)。我國上市公司以營業外損益操縱盈餘之探討(碩士論文)。國立政治大學。  延伸查詢new window
圖書
1.Ronen, J.、Sadan, S.(1981)。Smoothing Income Numbers: Objectives, Means and Implications。Addison-Wesley。  new window
 
 
 
 
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