本文旨在利用一個參賽者有工會、股東及經理人的不合作賽局，描述工會與股東 薪資談判過程及其均衡，文中引用反向歸納之方式來解釋均衡，除了發現在經理人扮演積極 角色後談判均衡的確存在外，本文亦可定義當實現盈餘不如預期時對資方利的談判區間。在 固守職位前主導權位在勞方，則經理人傾向預測高估的盈餘。當勞資雙方勢均力敵，則經理 人可以找到唯一之盈餘預估以達到勞資合諧進而固守職位。

　　　　　The paper is aimed at an uncooperative game, involoving labor union, sh areholders and manager. It depicts the salary negotiation procedure between labo r union and shareholders and their equilibrium. The backward induction is applie d to expain how the equilibrium is achieved. The results of our study suggest th at the equilibrium do exit when the manager plays an important role. Further, when the realized earnings are belw the forecasted earnings, the manager can find a range for negotiation whcih is to the benefit of the equity owners. In the presence of entrenchment, if empolyer plays a major role in the game, the manager is inclinded to forecast an underestimated earnings. On the other hand, if worksers play a leading role, the manager has the tendency to forecast an overestimated earnings. When the negotiation power beweeen the labor union and shareholders gets tied, the manager will find the only earnings forecast to get the harmony between the labor union and shareholders and entrench himself.