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題名:誠實且立即申報污染實況之誘因機制與環境政策的效果
書刊名:經濟論文
作者:黃宗煌楊東海
作者(外文):Huang, Chung-huangYang, Dong-hai
出版日期:1997
卷期:25:2
頁次:頁163-200
主題關鍵詞:自動申報誠實申報立即申報成本有效性政策失靈Self-reportTruthful reportImmediate reportCost effectivePolicy failure
原始連結:連回原系統網址new window
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  • 被引用次數被引用次數:期刊(3) 博士論文(1) 專書(0) 專書論文(0)
  • 排除自我引用排除自我引用:3
  • 共同引用共同引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:71
     本文首先建立一套誘因機制,以確保 「誠實且立即」 的 自動申報行為,然後分 析廠商在此一誘因機制下的污染防治行為,並探討管制單位應如何因應廠商的行為而建立最 適的管制政策,最後則討論此一自動申報制之成本有效性。本文結果顯示: (1) 吾人可經由 調查機率、排放費、與匿報罰鍰的設定來建立一般事件之誠實申報的誘因,而運用責任罰鍰 與延宕申報罰鍰的設計誘使廠商立即申報意外事件; (2) 「誠實且立即申報」的誘因機制雖 有其固有功能,但也可能成為政策失靈的另一來源,因為在此一機制下,總量標準的加嚴、 排放費與匿報罰鍰的提高均將失去其可有效誘導廠商加強防治工作的傳統認知; (3) 舉凡管 制單位之預算狀況、廠商之責任上限與時間偏好、以及受害者的檢舉行為等因素,均將影響 政策的制訂; (4) 唯有在某些特定的條件下,滿足「誠實且立即申報」的政策方能符合成本 有效性的原則。因此,管制單位在決定是否採用此一「誠實且立即申報」機制之前,應事先 對各行為主體的反應、及相關的參數或函數進行審慎評估,以防事倍功半。
     An incentive mechanism is designed to assure a truthful report of emission and an immediate report of polluting accidents. The firm's abatement behavior, the optimal environmental policy and its cost effectiveness are analyzed under this mechanism. While the mechanism could successfully induce the firm to report its emission truthfully and its accident immediately, it may become another source of policy failure. The optimal policy characterized by such a mechanism will be cost effective only when certain conditions are met. Any incentive mechanisms of this kind, therefore, should be carefully evaluated before its implementation, even if it is superficially appealing.
期刊論文
1.Sappington, David E. M.(1991)。Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships。Journal of Economic Perspectives,5(2),45-66。  new window
2.Jones, C. A.(1989)。Standard-setting with incomplete enforcement revisited。Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,8(1),72-87。  new window
3.Segerson, Kathleen(1988)。Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,15(1),87-98。  new window
4.Kwerel, E.(1977)。To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control。Review of Economic Studies,44(3),595-601。  new window
5.Kaplow, L.、Shavell, S.(1994)。Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior。Journal of Political Economy,102(3),583-606。  new window
6.Harford, Jon D.(1987)。Self-Reporting of Pollution and the Firm's Behavior under Imperfectly Enforceable Regulations。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,14,293-303。  new window
7.Xepapadeas, A. P.(1991)。Environmental policy under imperfect information: incentives and moral hazard。J. of Environmental Economics and Management,20,113-126。  new window
8.Harford, J. D.(1991)。Measurement Error and State-Dependent Pollution Control Enforcement。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,21,67-81。  new window
9.Harrington, W.(1988)。Enforcement Leverage with Penalties are Restricted。Journal of Public Economics,37,29-53。  new window
10.Jackson, M.、Moulin, H.(1992)。Implementing a Public Project and Distributing Its Cost。Journal of Economic Theory,57,125-140。  new window
11.Kambhu, J.(1989)。Regulatory Standards, Noncomplicance and Enforcement。Journal of Regulatory Economics,1(2),103-114。  new window
12.Malik, A. S.(1992)。Enforcement Cost and the Choice of Policy Instruments for Controlling Pollution。Economic Inquiry,30,714-721。  new window
13.Malik, A. S.(1993)。Self-Reporting and the Design of Policies for Regulating Stochastic Pollution。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,24,241-257。  new window
14.Mookherjee, D.、Png, I. R. L.(1992)。Monitoring vis-a'-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law。American Economic Review,82(3),556-565。  new window
15.Segerson, K.、Tietenberg, T.(1992)。The Structure of Penalties in Environment: An Economic Analysis。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,23,179-200。  new window
16.Shaffer, S.(1990)。Regulatory Compliance with Nonlinear Penalties。Journal of Regulatory Economics,2(1),99-103。  new window
17.Becker, Gary S.(1968)。Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach。Journal of Political Economy,76(2),169-217。  new window
18.Harford, J. D.(1978)。Firm Behavior under Imperfectly Enforceable Pollution Standards and Taxes。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,5(1),26-43。  new window
19.Scotchmer, S.、Jones, C. A.(1990)。The social cost of uniform regulatory standards in a hierarchical government。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,19,61-72。  new window
20.Zeckhauser, R. J.、Viscusi, W. K.(1979)。Optimal Standards With Incomplete Enforcement。Public Policy,27(4),437-456。  new window
21.Russell, C. S.(1990)。Game Models for Structuring Monitoring and Enforcement Systems。Natural Resource Modeling,4(2),143-173。  new window
22.Sinclair-Desgagne, Bernard、Gabel, H. Landis(1993)。Managerial Incentives and Environmental Compliance。Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,24,229-240。  new window
23.Roberts, M. J.、Spence, M.(1976)。Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty。Journal of Public Economics,5,193-208。  new window
會議論文
1.Wathieu, L.(1993)。Immediate Self-Reporting of Mistakes。The Fourth Congress of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists,(會議日期: 1993, June 30-July 3)。Fontainebleau。  new window
 
 
 
 
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