修訂野保法與加強稽查，對違法使用野生動物的行為是否具有足夠之約束力﹖本 文假設潛在違法者在違法的預期機會成本小於守法的預期成本時才採取違法行為，分析加重 罰則與誤判對於執法逮捕率設定範圍的影響。由逮捕率最低水準模擬值之分析發現，臺灣現 行之罰金及刑罰判決可能不足以遏阻潛在違法者之違法意圖與行為。再者，若維持現有的罰 金水準，則在加強管理之執行措施下，應提高逮捕率至 0.4 以上才能嚇阻違法。 若是一般 情況與誤判存在且罰金倍數小於 1 時，其逮捕率須大於 1， 但執法當局不可能做到此目標 ，因此非得提高罰金並配合適當的逮捕率才能收效。最後，由過去之判決資料顯示逮捕率約 為 11%，故在一般情況下，罰金至少應為違法利得之 4 倍以上； 加強管理下罰金至少應為 違法利得之 3-7 倍以上； 誤判存在但同時加重罰則時罰金至少應為違法利得之 7-13 倍； 誤判存在卻不加重處罰下則罰金至少應為違法利得之 28 倍以上，才能收嚇阻違法之效。

　　　　　This Study analyzes the effects of higher penalty and measurement errors on the enforcement of conservation law in Taiwan. We assume there is no collusion between regulatory agent and violators. Crimes are committed only when expected opportunity cost of violation is smaller than of compliance. We simulate the minimum detection rate required to induce compliance. The results show, under enhanced penalty structure, detection rate should be increased to 40% to prevent unlawful acts in wildlife conservation scheme. If measurement errors exist, current penalty structure is not effective unless detection rate exceeds 100%. Finally, with the average inspection rate of 11% from 1990 to 1993, fines should be set 4 times of the illegal gains when enhanced penalty structure is enact and should be set 28 times when measurement errors exist without the enhanced penalty. Fines should be set 7-13 times when enhancing penalty with the existence of measurement errors.