In order to manage its conflict with the People's Republic of China (PRC) over the Spratly Islands, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has adopted a policy of engagement in hopes of modifying Beijing's behavior. This article provides a critical analysis of this policy and argues that any such attempts to link the PRC to ASEAN's consultative process is unlikely to succeed due to China's aversionto becoming deeply engaged in the porcess. Furthermore, as a means of constraining the PRC, ASEAN's policy of engagement does not directly address the shifting terms of the regional security equation with China's emergence as a regional military power or possible regional hegemon. The article concludes that unless a state or a group of states in East Asia develop the capability and willingness to prevent China from becoming the regional hegemon, ASEAN countries will have to make concessions to China and appease its regional ambition. This means that they have to transform the goal of constrainment by engagement with the PRC to a policy of adjustment or appeasement by engagement.